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Article

RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY IN
IMMIGRATION SELECTION:
120 YEARS AFTER THE CHINESE
EXCLUSION CASE
Liav Orgad*
Theodore Ruthizer**
INTRODUCTION
120 years ago, in May 1889, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled
that "the power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of
1
sovereignty ... cannot be granted away or restrained. " Sixty
years later, in January 1950, at the height of the Cold War, the
U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed the plenary power doctrine by
holding that "it is not within the province of any court, unless
expressly authorized by law, to review the determination of the
political branch of the Government to exclude a given alien." 2
Another sixty years have passed and more recently, in February
2009, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit held that "a
nation-state has the inherent right to exclude or admit foreigners

* Radzyner School of Law. The Interdisciplinary Center (!DC) Herzliya: Visiting
Researcher. Harvard Law School. LLM .. Columbia Law School: LL.D. Candidate.
LLM .. Hebrew University of Jerusalem: LL.B .. B.A .. The Interdisciplinary Center
(!DC) Herzliya. Email: oliav@idc.ac.il.
** Lecturer in Law. Columbia Law School: Partner and Co-Head. Business
Immigration Group. Kramer Levin Naftalis & Frankel LLP: former President and
General
Counsel.
American
Immigration
Lawyers
Association.
Email:
truthizer@kramerlevin.com.
A previous version of the Article was presented at the International Conference on
Human Rights and Justice in Immigration at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem: we
thank the organizers and participants for their criticism. For insightful comments and
suggestions, we thank to Kevin Johnson. Shay Lavie. Stephen Legomsky. Barak Medina.
Amnon Rubinstein, and Adam Shinar. We are particularly indebted to Christian Joppke.
whose valuable suggestions on earlier drafts helped us to improve the paper.
1. See Chae Chan Ping (The Chinese Exclusion Case). 130 U.S. 581. 609 (1889).
2 See Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 U.S. 537.542--43 (1950).
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and to prescribe applicable terms and conditions for their
3
exclusion and admission. " The principle to decide "which alien
may, and which alien may not, enter the United States, and on
what terms," Judge Randolph firmly asserted, ''has been a
matter of political determination by each state-a matter wholly
outside the concern and competence of the judiciary."~
In principle, the political branches continue to enjoy plenary
power to decide who may enter and who may stay. But this is not
the full picture. One should not think that nothing has changed
since the nineteenth century, and that the political branches are
given carte blanche to decide the rules of the immigration issue.
As a matter of fact (and law), a lot has been changed since-in
the United States and elsewhere. In the most detailed book on
ethnic selectivity in immigration law, Christian Joppke shows
how liberal democracies have generally abandoned ethnic
selection and moved in a more liberal course.; Changes in
domestic law and international human rights law have restrained
states' power to regulate the terms for immigration selection.
States can still control immigration, but they are more limited by
some base-level standards of permissible and impermissible
criteria. Determining the limits of what is permissible, and
discussing whether permissible criteria include decisions made
on the basis of race, religion and nationality, is the focus of this
Article.
The topic of permissible and impermissible immigration
criteria is a neglected field in constitutional law and political
theory. There is little literature on the ethics of criteria for
exclusion and inclusion of immigrants. It is also rare to find a
detailed account on the ethics of permissible and impermissible
criteria in other fields, such as security policies. Back in 1997,
Vice President Al Gore's Report on Aviation Safety and Security
noted that it is permissible to develop and implement profiling
systems in aviation procedures for questioning and searching
passengers- as long as the profile is not based on "national
origin, racial, ethnic, religious or gender characteristics" of
citizens. 6 In Canada, a Governmental Commission concluded
3. See Kiyemba v. Obama, 555 F.3d 1022. 1025. (D.C. Cir. 2009). cere. granted. 130
S. Ct. 458 (2009).
4. !d. at 1026.
5. See generally CHRISTIAN JOPPKE. SELECfl!'iG BY ORIGIN: ETHNIC MIG RATIO:"
IN THE LIBERAL STATE (2005).
6. See WHITE HOUSE COMMISSION ON AVIATION SAFETY AND SECURITY: FINAL
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that national security investigations can be based upon country
of origin, but "must not be based on racial, religious or ethnic
profiling." 7 In Europe, the Council of the European Union
recommended that Member States develop and use terrorist
profiles in combating terrorism- with special attention given to
their use in immigration context. Factors of terrorist profiles may
include nationality, place of birth, age, gender, and physical
distinguishing features but must exclude race, ethnicity, and
religion.R Why are these criteria impermissible, while others are
permissible? What are the factors that make the difference?
Little literature exists on the theory and typology of immigration
criteria. This Article is intended to fill the gap.
The Article proceeds as follows: Part I offers an innovative
approach to tackle the issue of immigration restrictions. It
challenges the traditional concept in the literature under which
criteria and justifications for controlling immigration are tied
together. According to the conventional view, there are some
permissible and impermissible justifications to limit immigration
and, accordingly, some permissible and impermissible criteria.
Thus, if one believes that preserving the national culture is a
legitimate justification to restrict immigration, one usually
concludes that it is also legitimate to use culture as a criterion for
immigration selection. On the other hand, if one believes that
cultural continuity is an unjustifiable purpose in restricting
immigration, one usually concludes that immigrants' cultural
backgrounds should be excluded from the process of
immigration selection. Part I departs from this view by
distinguishing between criteria and justifications. It calls for a
two-stage process of immigration selection under which states
will be required to present a legitimate justification to restrict
immigration and, in addition, a legitimate criterion serving this
justification. In other words: in order to restrict immigration,
states will need to justify both the justifications and the criteria
9
used. The Article focuses on the second stage. It asks whether
REPORT TO PRESIDENT CLIKTON (Feb. 12. 1997).
7. See COM\1ISSION OF INQUIRY INTO THE ACTIONS OF CANADIAN OFFICIALS IN
RELATION TO MAHER ARAR. REPORT OF THE EVENTS RELATING TO MAHER ARAR:
ANALYSIS AKD RECOMMEKDATIONS (Sept. 18. 2006).

8. See Draft Council Recommendation on the Development of Terrorist Profiles.
Council of the European Union (Nov. 28. 2002).
9. The terms qualifications. criteria. grounds. terms and conditions are used here
interchangeably. We also use interchangeably the terms permissible or impermissible and
legitimate or illegitimate criteria. though they are not always the same (permissible
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race. religion and nationality could ever be legitimate
immigration criteria when they serve a legitimate purpose.
Part II is descriptive: It presents current immigration laws in
the United States. In a pre-9/11 world. many scholars believed
that race-based immigration law was withering away.w Part II
shows that these forecasts were premature. Racial classifications
continue to shape the process of immigration selection. Part II
also distinguishes between different criteria used to select
immigrants: race. ethnicity. religion, and nationality. These are
different criteria that require a different analysis. Part II
demonstrates how official and central race-based classifications
remain to date. While there is a general process of
liberalization- racial classifications have become less direct and
arbitrary, positive rather than negative. nationality-based more
than race-based- it was too early to celebrate their
disappearance. Race-based criteria remain formal, group-based
in nature. and apply to admission and naturalization. This reality
has been strengthened by three reasons: the "War on Terror"
and post-9111 security concerns, ongoing cultural clashes
between native and immigrant groups, and a process of reethnicization under which nation-states grant privileges to ethnic
diaspora in admission and eligibility to citizenship.
Part III is normative: It asks whether the use of race,
ethnicity, religion and nationality in immigrant selection can be
legally permitted. The conventional view is that race, ethnicity
and religion (as opposed to nationality) are impermissible
criteria. Under this dichotomous view. there are clearly
11
permissible and clearly impermissible immigration criteria. Part
III challenges this view by considering three normative
disciplines to analyze race-based immigration classifications:
constitutional law, international human rights law and moral
philosophy. It shows that under each discipline, the use of race.
ethnicity, religion and nationality could (and sometimes should)
matter in the process of immigrant selection. This might not be
desirable or a wise policy. but it still permits a narrow road to

criteria are not necessarily legitimate).
10. See. e.g .. Gabriel J. Chin. Is There a Plenary Power Doctrine:? A Tentative
Apologv and Prediction for Our Strange but Unexceptional Constiwtional Immigration
Law, 14 GEO. IM:\1IG. L.J. 257 (2000).
11. See, e.g.. Joseph H. Carens. Who Should Get In?: The Ethics of Immigration
Admissions. 17 ETHICS & INT'L AFF. 95 (2003) (arguing that race. religion and ethnicity
are always illegitimate immigration criteria).
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use race as a criterion in immigration policy. Part III also
sketches the considerations required to withstand the legal
conditions for such race-based use. In a nutshell, from a
constitutional perspective, race can be a permissible criterion
under the Fourteenth Amendment when it is based on reliable
statistical evidence and as long as race is not the exclusive factor,
whether the policy is racially motivated or not. The Fourteenth
Amendment takes account of racial prejudice yet does not
require satisfying strict scrutiny because immigration is usually
seen as extraconstitutional area. From an international human
rights law perspective. the prohibitions against racial
discrimination have broad exemptions in the field of
immigration. In principle. race can matter when its use is not
arbitrary, serves a legitimate purpose and is proportional. From
a moral perspective based on the principle of corrective justice,
race can matter when it is aimed at correcting past wrongs, a
kind of reparation for past exploitation. From a perspective of
distributive justice, race can matter when it is intended at
allocation of goods. In these situations, race-based classifications
have different justifications, goals and scope, nonetheless they
are not excluded per se; they are context-based.
Part IV focuses on one common justification invoked by
some advocates of immigration restrictions-protecting national
security. In a post 9111 world, the use of race, religion and
nationality in immigrant selection has increased. In the public
debate, a common locution was the "yes, but" argument, that is,
racial selection may be forbidden BUT the War on Terror is a
different context. Under this view, avoiding enhanced scrutiny of
Muslims would be "an invitation to further terror. " 12 Part IV
tackles the contention on the effectiveness of racial immigration
criteria as a counterterrorism measure. It casts doubts on three
issues: First, on the statistical level, the use of racial
classifications often lacks statistical correlation. Second, on the
effectiveness leveL such use has not yet proved as cost-effective.
Third, on the psychological level. there is an unconscious human
tendency to use racial criteria more than their actual predictor
contribution justifies. The "'most-likely-strategy" is sometimes a
cognitive bias and a psychological (and statistical) error. Hence,

12. See Daniel Pipes. The Enemy Within. N.Y. POST. Jan. 24. 2003; Paul Sperry.
When the Profile Fits the Crime. N.Y. TI'v!ES. July 28. 2005.
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it is necessary to consider some alternatives for immigration
selection.
Part V develops a typology of immigrant selection. It
employs two tests-the policy's motivation and the policy's
effect- to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate cases:
using racial criteria to achieve either a racial purpose or a nonracial purpose, and using facially-neutral criteria to achieve
either a racial purpose or a non-racial purpose. Part V then
presents four alternative methods of immigrant selection. The
first is universal selection. This method focuses on non-racial
immigration criteria. These can be ascribed characteristics, such
as one's gender, or achieved characteristics, such as one's
education or skills. The second is positive selection. This method
does not target unwanted immigrants but instead is designed to
identify preferred immigrants. While universal selection is
premised on non-racial criteria, positive selection permits the
use of race as one of the preferred criteria. The third is random
selection. This method calls for lottery distribution of visas.
Immigrants are selected by casting lots. The fourth is racial
selection with just compensation. This method permits the use of
race so long as it is accompanied by just compensation for the
discriminatory effect. Part V shows how none of these methods
has taken away the controversy about race, and how even
facially-neutral methods, such as random or universal selection,
are rooted in race. As the immigration debate in the country
continues to percolate, the issue of immigrant selection has both
theoretical and practical significance.
I. CRITERIA AND JUSTIFICATIONS

In The Law of Peoples, John Rawls argued for a "qualified
right to limit immigration." 13 The challenge is to grasp what the
legitimate qualifications are. The starting point of this Article is
thus the premise that a sovereign state has a qualified right to
limit immigration and thereby set some criteria for exclusion and
inclusion. It is possible to challenge this premise, as some
scholars have done, 14 but the still widely accepted proposition in

13. See JOHN RAWLS, THE LAW OF PEOPLES 39 (1999).
14. See. e.g.. Joseph H. Carens. Migration and Morality: A Liberal Egalitarian
Perspective. in FREE MOVEMENT: ETHICAL ISSUES IN THE TRANSNATIONAL
MIGRATION OF PEOPLE AND OF MONEY 25 (Brian Barry & Robert Goodin eds .. 1992):
Jonathan Seglow. The Ethics of Immigration, 3 POL. STUD. REV. 317 (2005).
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international human rights law is that states can generally decide
the qualifications for admission and naturalization.
Many scholars have enriched the discussion on justifications
to limit immigration. Henry Sidgwick notes that states can
restrict immigration to protect "the internal cohesion of a
nation" and to "maintain an adequately high quality of civilized
life. " 1' Joseph Carens supports states' right to restrict
immigration based on a threat to the public order, national
16
security, liberal democratic values and economic well-being. In
The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, James Hudson analyzes
five common justifications to restrict immigration-protecting
the wages of the native workers, protecting the ethnic and
cultural makeup of the society, avoiding unwanted burden on
the native population (air pollution, welfare burden, etc.),
preventing criminal activity and harm to national security
interests, and maintaining a dominant, privileged position. 17 In
Immigration: The Case for Limits, David Miller presents two
justifications for limiting immigration-cultural continuity and
population control. 1H In a later essay, Miller makes a case for
other justifications, such as protecting principles of political
19
liberalism. In a recent article, Stephen Macedo describes
several justifications used by liberal democracies to restrict
immigration, such as protecting the social solidarity and
20
supporting social justice at home. But whether one finds the
21
justification in a liberal theory or a communitarian theory, 22 the

15. See HENRY SIDGWICK. THE ELEMENTS OF POLITICS 309 (4th ed .• 1919).
16. See Joseph H. Carens. Aliens and Citizens: The Case for Open Borders, in
THEORIZING CITIZENSHIP 229. 237-41 (Ronald S. Beiner ed., 2007). Carens actually
makes a case for open borders yet accepts some narrow liberal justifications for limiting
immigration.
17. See James L. Hudson. The Ethics of Immigration Restriction, 10 Soc. THEORY
& PRAC. 201 (1984).
18. See David Miller. Immigration: The Case for Limits, in CONTEMPORARY
DEBATES IN APPLIED ETHICS 193 (Andrew Cohen & Christopher H. Wellman eds.,
2005).
19. See David Miller. Immif?rants, Nations, and Citizenship. 6 J. POL. PHIL. 371
(2008).
20. See Stephen Macedo. When and Whv Should Liberal Democracies Restrict
!tnmif?ration 7 . in CITIZENSHIP. BORDERS. AND-HUMAN NEEDS (Rogers M. Smith ed.,
2010).
21. See WILL KYMLICKA. LIBERALISM. COMMUNITY AND CULTURE (1989);
Carens. supra note 14: Macedo. supra note 20: A vishai Margalit & Moshe Halbertal,
Liberalism and the Right to Culture. 61 Soc. RES. 491 (1994).
22. See MICHAEL WALZER. SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND
EQL:ALITY (1983): Miller. supra notes 18 and 19.
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literature on the justifications to restrict immigration is vast and
well-established.
The discussion about legitimate and illegitimate
justifications to limit migration- whatever these justifications
are-says little about legitimate and illegitimate criteria. One
could argue that a state is justified in limiting immigration for
the purpose of preserving the cultural composition of the
society. This justification, however, does not necessarily mean
inclusion or exclusion of immigrants who share similar cultural
characteristics. On the one hand. giving preferences to
educated and skills-based immigrants over family-based
immigrants might reduce the number of Latino immigrants and
increase the number of Western European immigrants. Under
this view, a points-based immigration system. similar to those
used in Britain and Canada, might have cultural implications
on the composition of qualified immigrants. In this case, the
state uses non-cultural criteria to achieve a cultural purpose.
On the other hand, states can use culture-based criteria to
achieve a non-cultural purpose. One purpose can be national
security: in this context, culture is a pretext for keeping out
certain kinds of immigrants who might be regarded as security
risks, or even as potential terrorists. A second purpose can be
related to the population size, that is, culture is a criterion in
the general enterprise to restrict immigration. Under that
explanation, states do not want immigration on a broad scale,
irrespective of its composition, and culture is just another
means to reduce the number. A third purpose can be protecting
the welfare system, that is, culture is used to keep out
immigrants who might become a financial burden. The
assumption here is that there is a link between culture and the
chances of participation in the job market. A fourth purpose
can be promoting the social cohesion, that is, culture is used
based upon the premise under which a cultural homogeneous
society is more stable. The assumption here is that a society
that is too diverse may lose its solidarity and, as a result, may
even cease to exist as a sovereign state.
Criteria and justifications for immigrant selection do not
live in a different planet; they are related. An illegitimate
justification may annul the validation of the criterion used; if the
end is illegitimate, the means may be invalidated too. Yet a
legitimate end is only the first step. It has to be followed by a
second step, which is the need to justify the criterion used. To
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return to Miller's claim about cultural continuity, even if there
are legitimate reasons for such an end, one still has to deal with
the question of the criteria used to achieve cultural preservation.
Miller himself supports broad grounds for immigrant selection.
Under his view, "given that states are entitled to put a ceiling on
the numbers of people they take it in ... they need to select
somehow. if only by lottery."" But what does "somehow" mean?
Miller mentions different criteria: speaking the native language,
cultural perceptions of the applicant and, in rare cases,
religion- "religion could be a relevant criterion only where it
continues to form an essential part of the public culture. as in the
24
case of the state of Israel. " This connection, however, is far
from being simple. Even if states have a right to restrict
immigration, and even if this right includes cultural continuity as
a legitimate end. it does not follow that states can pick and
choose whatever criteria they want.
In the next sections, we discuss the criteria of race, ethnicity,
religion and nationality. We first describe their different uses in
immigrant selection and then discuss related legal issues. It is
important to keep in mind the following distinctions: First,
criteria for exclusion are generally not identical with criteria for
inclusion. Exclusion criteria set grounds for inadmissibility; for
example, under the category of security-related issues, different
exclusionary criteria exist, such as terrorist activities,
participation in a Nazi-based persecution and membership in a
2
totalitarian party. ' Inclusion criteria set grounds for prioritizing
certain aliens in immigration; examples are the use of education,
economic characteristics and family ties. Joppke attractively
catches this as a distinction between negative and positive
2
immigration selection. " Second, some criteria are individualbased while others are group-based. Individualistic criteria focus
on characteristics of individuals- whether or not they
individually present a security risk, vulnerability to becoming a

23.
24.

See Miller. supra note 18. at 204.
!d.
25. See 8 U.S.C. 1182 (2008).
26. See JOPPKE. supra note 5. at 22-23. 220-24. Joppke rightly mentions that
although positive and negative selectivity '"are evidently made from starkly different
moral cloth··. this distinction ··is not as clean and clear as it seems··. Preferring A means
discriminating against B- '"the reverse side of prioritizing some is discriminating against
all others ... Joppke. however. refers to group selectivity. He gives Asians exclusion from
the United States and German and Israel's Laws of Return as examples of negative and
positive selectivity.

*
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public charge, or suffering from physical or mental disorder.
Group-based criteria treat individuals as part of collective
groups; examples include policies that exclude Asians. or include
7
ethnic Jews and Germans." Third, in principle. different criteria
exist for admission into the country and for admission into the
citizenry. Criteria such as national security, public order and
public health exist as part of the admission process, while other
criteria-such as language proficiency, civic knowledge, and
attachments to the Constitution-exist as part of the
28
naturalization process. These distinctions are often blurred. For
instance, in some countries, a language requirement exists not
only for naturalization but also for admission. Fourth, different
criteria generally apply differently to different types of
immigrants. Criteria for admitting family members are not
identical with those applied to asylum seekers. economic
migrants and seasonal workers. And last, immigration criteria
can be observed directly from law reports, and indirectly by
looking at impacts and effects. Thus, a facially-neutral criterion
may hide, intentionally or accidentally, a suspect criterion.
A note on terminology: the term "immigration selection ..
refers in this Article to three fields: selecting people in entering a
country
(admission),
joining
a
political
community
(naturalization), and deportation (removal). The Article leaves
out other immigration issues, such as denaturalization or
granting rights to immigrants. A difficult issue is defining race
and ethnicity. There are many ways to define race and
ethnicity -sociological, ethnological, geographical. historical. or
a combination of these-while each definition may have
different components, require a different discussion and lead to
a different conclusion. We do not pretend to solve this puzzle
here by suggesting a legal definition. "y Instead, we use race and
27. One could claim that even individualistic criteria are based on collective
presumptions. See Liav Orgad. Love and War: Family Migration in Time of National
Emergency. 23 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 85. 108--12 (2008).
28. For admission and naturalization criteria in 27 European countries. see
COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE LAWS IN THE 27 EU MEMBER STATES FOR LEGAL
IMMIGRATION 473-93 (2008). For admission and naturalization criteria in the United
States. see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY & CRISTINA M. RODRIGGEZ. IMMIGRATION A!'iD
REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY 250--354. 420--62. 1305-DS (5th ed .. 2009): THOMAS A.
ALEINIKOFF, DAVID MARTIN. HIROSHI MOTOML'RA & MARYELLE!'i FULLERTO:--;.
IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND POLICY 63-82. 297-307. 507-77 (6th ed.
2008).
29. For a discussion of legal definitions of race. ethnicity. descent and ancestry. see
Sharona Hoffman. Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept>. 36 ARIZ. L.J. 1093
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ethnicity in the subjective manner used by governments and the
courts,'( though we often use an umbrella category of "racial
criteria'' or "racial classifications" to describe race, ethnicity and
religion together. As for nationality. we refer to nationality to
include two concepts: the first refers to one's country of birth or
of current citizenship. The second refers to one's national or
31
ethnic origins. regardless of citizenship.
II. RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY:
DO THEY STILL MA TIER?
On May 1882, Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act.
The Act authorized the executive branch to exclude persons of
Chinese descent.'" Chae Chan Ping was a Chinese-born laborer
who lived in California for many years. Before he departed the
United States for a brief visit to his native China, he had
obtained a certificate that would entitle him to return to the
United States. But during his absence, Congress amended the
law to ban the reentry of Chinese, including those with validlyissued certificates. When Chae Chan Ping arrived at the Port of
San Francisco, he was barred from reentering. He challenged his
exclusion in a case that came before the Supreme Court in May
1889 and became known as the Chinese Exclusion Case. The
Court sustained the Chinese Exclusion Act and set ground rules
for plenary power of the political branches over immigration
that reverberate some 120 years later. 33 Justice Field, writing for
a unanimous Court, noted that Chinese are racially different.
They "remained strangers in the land. residing apart by
themselves and adhering to the customs and usages of their own
country. It seemed impossible for them to assimilate with our
people or to make any change in their habits or modes of
34
living. " Justice Field went even further to stress a demographic
concern- "as they grew in numbers each year," they would
(2004).
30. The focus is direct use of race and ethnicity as opposed to using indirect traits
that may indicate one's race and ethnicity. such as language. accent. dress code. physical
characteristics and surnames.
31. Some courts interpreted the term "national origin" more broadly to include the
country from which one's ancestors came. See. e.g.. Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co .. 414 U.S.
86. 88 (1973 ).
32. 22 Stat. 58. ch. 126. The Act was not based on citizenship but on descent. It
applied to "all subjects of China and Chinese. whether subjects of China or anv other
foreign power. .. with the exception of scholars and merchants.
·
33. See The Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. at 581.
34. !d. at 595.
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present "great danger that at no distant day that portion of our
country would be overrun by them unless prompt action was
taken to restrict their immigration."" The Court characterized
the Chinese Exclusion Act as "protective legislation ..,,h
The Chinese Exclusion Case spoke in very broad terms to
build a structure of broad governmental powers to control
immigration. Individual exclusion "is only an application of the
same power to particular classes of persons, whose presence is
37
deemed injurious. " The power to exclude aliens, and to
prescribe terms for exclusion. is part of the nation ·s
independence, the foreign affairs power. and the right to selfpreservation.3x This power ''cannot be granted away or
restrained'' and is not a question ··for judicial determination ... w
This seminal case established the so-called Plenary Power
Doctrine, which gives Congress and the Executive an unfettered
right to regulate immi~ation issues under a wide range of
constitutional immunity. Immigration has been established as a
kind of extraconstitutional area.
120 years have passed since the Chinese Exclusion Case. Is
this case a relic from another era or still good law? This Part

35. /d.
36. !d.
37. !d. at 608 (emphasis added). Years later. the Court reaffirmed racial exclusion
of Japanese and high-caste Hindus. See Morrison , .. California. 291 C.S. 82. 86 (1934)
("The privilege of naturalization is denied to all who are not white (unless the applicants
are of African nativity or African descent): and men are not white if the strain of colored
blood in them is a h~lf or a quarter. or. not improbably. even less"): United States v.
Thind. 261 U.S. 204 (1923) (holding that a high-caste Hindu is not eligible for
naturalization because he is not a "Caucasian"): Ozawa v. United States. 260 U.S. 178
(1922) (holding that people of Japanese descent are not "white .. and hence are not an
admissible race for naturalization).
38. See The Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. 581. 603-04: see also Mathews v.
Diaz. 426 U.S. 67. 81 (1976): Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753.770 (1972): Boutilier v.
INS. 387 U.S. 118. 123 (1967): Harisiades v. Shaughnessy. 342 U.S. 580. 588-90 (1952):
Carlson v. Landon. 342 U.S. 524. 537 (1952): Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338 U.S. 537. 542
(1950): United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp .. 299 U.S. 304. 315-18 (1936): Fong
Yue Ting v. United Stated. 149 U.S. 698. 707 (1893): Nishimura Ekiu v. United States.
142 U.S. 651.659 (1892): Guan Chow Tok v. INS. 456 F.2d 1239 (5th Cir. 1972).
39. See The Chinese Exclusion Case. 130 U.S. 581. 606-09.
40. The literature on the plenary power doctrine is vast. See. e.g.. STEPHEN H.
LEGOMSKY. IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN A"iD
AMERICA 177-222 (1987): Stephen H. Legomsky. Immigration Law and the Principle of
Plenary Congressional Power. 6 SUP. CT. REV. 255 (1984): Hiroshi Motomura.
Immigration Law After a Century of Plenary Power: Phantom Constitutional Norms and
Statutory Interpretation. 100 YALE L.J. 545 (1990): Cornelia T.L. Pillard & Alexander
Aleinikoff. Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicial and Executive Branch Decision
Making in Miller v. Albright. 1998 SL'P. CT. REV. 1 ( 1999).
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shows how racial classifications remain central in immigration
policy. True, they have become less direct and arbitrary. positive
rather than negative, nationality-based more than race-based,
but, in principle, they are still with us after all. The discussion
starts with nationality-based restrictions. moves to religious
distinctions, and concludes with racial and ethnic classifications:~
It focuses on law and policy in the United States, though it
provides some examples from other countries. It focuses on
official policies and not on abuse of discretion by individual
officers.
A. NATIONALITY-BASED RESTRICTIONS
Nationality-based distinctions have permeated the United
States immigration policy for a long time. Tracing our path back
to the National Origins Quota System of 1921. country of origin
has played a significant role in defining U.S. immigration policy.
Although the national origins quota system ended in 1965.
nationality-based distinctions continue to be a foundation block
of the U.S. system, as reflected in per-country quotas (based on
country of birth), expedited treatment for temporary visitors
coming from certain low-fraud countries. eligibility for the
Diversity Visa Lottery based on country of birth, the designation
of certain visa-issuing consulates for applications based on
country of birth, and many other examples liberally sprinkled
throughout the INA. There is nothing peculiarly 'American' in
these policies. In a post-Westphalian world divided by nationstates, nationality plays a major role in defining international
relations. Immigration agencies are often given a wide berth to
favor certain nationals over others in the way visas are issued,
their length and terms. exemptions from visas. setting of country
quotas for immigrant visas and negotiated nonimmigrant
statuses accorded to Australians, Canadians. Chileans and
Singaporeans. Under U.S. law. for instance. Israelis can take

41. The focus of the Article is current and recent immigration policies. The Article
thus avoids discussing race-based policies that were employed in the United States a long
time ago. For past policies. see ROGER DA'.'IELS. COMI'-'G TO A\IERICA: A HISTORY OF
IMMIGRATION AND ETH;-.;ICITY !'-' A\IERICAN LIFE (2002): Jom; HIGHAM. STRANGERS
11' THE LAND: PATTERNS OF A\IERICA"i NATIVIS\1. 1860-1925 (2d ed. 1988): JOPPKE.
supra note 5. at 36--43. 52-59: Ian F.H. Lopez. Racial Restrictions in the Law of
Citizenship. in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: RACIAL CLASSIFICATION AND HISTORY 109
(E. Nathaniel Gates ed .. 1997): Patrick Wei!. Races at the Gate: A Centurv of Racial
Distinctions in American Immigration Policy (}865-1965). IS GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 625
(2001).
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advantage of qualifying for the Treaty Trader nonimmigrant
status, while Brazilians may not. 42
Emphasis on nationality became more intense following the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. 4 ' Soon thereafter, the
Department of Justice began an aggressive new program, the
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS),
imposing entry and exit special registration requirements on
male nonimmigrants (temporary residents), aged sixteen and
older. from twenty-five designated countries (twenty-four Arab
and other predominantly Muslim states, plus North Korea).
Citizens of a designated country were required to be interviewed
and fingerprinted. The requirements applied on the basis of
national origin, not on the basis of one's country of citizenship. 44
But while even Jews or Christians born in such countries as
Morocco were subject to the registration requirements, the
impact was felt overwhelmingly by Muslims born in those
countries. In a constitutional challenge to the NSEERS
regulations, a Moroccan citizen argued that this registration
scheme violated the equal protection principles of the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause since it targeted only
4
nationals of certain countries. ; The U.S. Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny test and held that
admission criteria solely based upon nationality are acceptable
so long as they are "substantially related" to the achievement of
important objectives, such as national security. 46 Other courts,
however, applied a rational basis test, holding that '"distinctions
on basis of nationality may be drawn in the immigration field by

42. See § 201(c) of the INA (for allocation of family-sponsored immigrants).
§201(d) (for employment-based immigrants).§ 217 (for Visa Waiver Program rules) and
§101(a)(15)(E)(i) (for Treaty Trader nonimmigrant status).
43. See Stephen H. Legomsky. The Ethnic and Religious Profiling of Nonciti:.ens:
National Security and International Human Rights. 25 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 161. 16377 (2005).
44. See National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). Fed. Reg.
52584-93 (Aug. 12. 2002). The list includes "nationals or citizens" -it applies even in
cases of dual nationals of a non-registrant country-of Afghanistan. Algeria. Bangladesh.
Bahrain. Egypt. Eritrea. Indonesia. Iran. Iraq. Jordan. Kuwait. Lebanon. Libya.
Morocco. North Korea. Oman. Pakistan. Qatar. Saudi Arabia Somalia. Sudan. Syna.
Tunisia. United Arab Emirates and Yemen. Following criticism. the Department of
Homeland Security suspended the NSEERS on December 2003. See 68 Fed. Reg. 67578
(Dec. 2. 2003).
45. See Kandamar v. Gonzales. 464 F.3d 65 (1st Cir. 2006).
46. /d. at 72-73 ("Congress may permissibly set immigration criteria based on an
alien's nationality or place of origin ... [for] monitoring nationals from certain countries
to prevent terrorism.").
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Congress or by the Executive" and "so long as such distinctions
47
are not wholly irrational they must be sustained."
In the wake of 9111. Congress has banned the admission of
nonimmigrant aliens from states sponsoring terrorism. Section
306 of the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Reform Act of
2002 provides that "no nonimmigrant visa ... shall be issued to
any alien from a country that is a state sponsor of international
terrorism unless the Secretary of State determines ... that such
alien does not pose a threat to the safety or national security of
the United States." ~ The justification for this rule relies on the
fact that all of the nineteen hijackers legally entered the country
as nonimmigrant visitors. Some people believe that this fact
justifies extra scrutiny of nonimmigrant Middle Eastern
49
Muslims. But while the rule does not apply to countries such as
Egypt or Saudi Arabia, it applies to Cuba.'o In addition, the term
"any alien from a country" has been interpreted broadly to
include any person born in a designated country, whether or not
the person is a resident of that country.'!
Some twenty-three years earlier, American courts similarly
accepted special registration requirements targeted solely
4

47. See Roudnahal v. Ridge. 310 F. Supp. 2d 884. 892 (N.D. Ohio 2003). In fact. all
the Courts of Appeals that had considered the constitutional validity of the NSEERS
held that special registration of aliens based on nationality did not violate the Equal
Protection Clause. See Rajah v. Mukasey. 544 F.3d 427. 435 (2d Cir. 2008)
("Classifications on the basis of nationality are frequently unavoidable in immigration
matters ... such classifications is commonplace and almost inevitable. Indeed. the very
concept of ·alien· is a nationality-based classification."): Malik v. Gonzales. 213 Fed.
Appx. 173 (4th Cir. 2007) (explaining that courts have no jurisdiction to review equal
protection challenges in immigration cases): Zerrei v. Gonzales. 471 F.3d 342. 347-48 (2d
Cir. 2006) (rejecting the claim that the NSEERS violates the equal protection clause):
Zafar v. U.S. Attorney General. 461 F.3d 1357. 1367 (llthCir. 2006) ("Petitioners' equal
protection rights were not violated by being required to be registered in the national
Security Entry-Exit Registration System."): Sewani v. Gonzales. 162 Fed. Appx. 285. 287
(5th Cir. 2006) ("Due process does not require Congress to grant aliens from all nations
with the same chances for admission to or remaining with the United States. Congress
may permissibly set immigration criteria that are sensitive to an alien's nationality or
place of origin."): Shaybob v. U.S. Attorney General. 189 Fed. Appx. 127. 129-30 (3d
Cir. 2006) ("The Call-In Program does not violate the Equal Protection guarantee of the
Fifth Amendment . . . the power to exclude or expel particular classes of aliens is
historically within the province of the political branches."): Ali v. Gonzalez. 440 F.3d 678.
681 (5th Cir. 2006) ("Nationality classification has been repeatedly upheld by this Court
and others against constitutional attack.").
48. 107 Pub. L. No. 107-173. 116 Stat. 543 (2002).
49. See Janice L. Kephart. Immigration and Terrorism: Moving Beyond the 9!11
Staff Report on Terrorist Travel. CESTER FOR IMMIGRATION STCDIES (Sept. 1. 2005).
50. This provision currently applies to Iran. Syria. Sudan and Cuba. See http://
travel.state.gov/visa/temp/info/info_1300.html.
51. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 175.
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against Iranian students present in the United States following
the Iranian Revolution. In Narenji v. Civiletti,'" the plaintiffs
argued that nationality distinctions among nonimmigrant
students violated the Equal Protection Clause. In a divided en
bane ruling. the D.C. Circuit roundly rejected this position,
saying that the Attorney General was permitted wide latitude to
draw distinctions on the basis of nationality, having to meet only
a rational basis test.'' However, four dissenting judges took a
different view. asserted that U.S. law has a "deep aversion to
selective law enforcement against a group solely on the basis of
their country of origin. '''4 The dissent revealed the great divide in
U.S. immigration law: special concerns for civil and criminal
rights of immigrants present in the country against expansive
executive power to decide who is admitted and under what
terms.
Israel, too. presents an interesting case for nationality-based
distinctions. Israeli law currently presumes that citizens or
residents of Iran. Syria. Lebanon, Iraq and the Palestinian
Authority pose a security risk.'' Thus. they are inadmissible, en
masse.'" Israeli law is based on a "presumption of
dangerousness" that is difficult to rebut in an individual case. In
a constitutional challenge to the statute. The Citizenship and
7
Entry into Israel Act (Temporary Order) 2003,' the petitioners
claimed in the High Court of Justice (HCJ) that this policy
discriminates against certain national groups. The petitioners.
Palestinian citizens of Israel who asked for family reunification
with Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza, argued that the
statute presents a case of disparate impact since its effects mostly
Palestinian citizens and has a negligible impact on Jewish
citizens. The Israeli Government contended that the statute is
not discriminatory as it excludes only enemy aliens, regardless
their national origin. Had Israel wished to exclude only

52. 617 F.2d 745. 747-48 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
53. /d. at 748.
54. Jd. at 754. The Court really meant national origin. not just country of
citizenship.
55. See The Citizenship and Entry into Israel Act (Temporary Order) 2007.
56. See Daphne Barak-Erez. Israel: Citizenship and Immigration Law in the Vise of
Security. Nationalitv. and Human Rights. 6 INT'L J. CONST. LAW 184 (2008); Orgad. supra
note 27. at 95-101.
57. See S.H. 544.
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Palestinians, it would have prohibited admission of Palestinians,
irrespective of where they actually lived.'R
In one of the most controversial decisions ever issued in
Israel, the Supreme Court sitting as the HCJ sustained the
statute. 59 Justice Mishael Cheshin, speaking for the majority,
held that the statute is not discriminatory because the person's
nationality is only a by-product of being an enemy alien. Israeli
Arabs can marry Palestinians all over the world, excluding only
those territories where an armed conflict is being conducted.
"This ban does indeed harm a minority group of which the vast
majority are Arabs, but this harm derives from the marriage to
enemy nationals ... and not from the fact that they are Arabs,"
Cheshin said. 60 Chief Justice Barak dissented. In Barak's view,
the statute is discriminatory because the burden falls mostly on
Israeli Arabs. Justice Barak was willing to assume that no
intentional discrimination existed, yet the important element is
not intent but effect. He held that "the question is not merely
the motivation of the decision-makers; the question is also what
61
is the outcome of the decision." The case poses interesting
questions: Should states measure intent or effect in evaluating
nationality-based discrimination? Are criteria such as enmity or
62
alienation the same as nationality?
The United States and Israel have employed nationalitybased restrictions as a counterterrorism measure. In both
countries, the use of nationality as an immigration criterion is
official and, in both, the justification of the criterion is
presumably based on protecting national security. The right
question, however, is whether nationality-based restrictions can
be considered legitimate criteria to serve national security, which
is generally considered a widely-accepted justification for
limiting immigration. The answer depends, inter alia, on the
degree to which the restrictions protect the nation's security, as

58. The statute did not effect Palestinians all over the world exclusive of the
Palestinian territories.
59. See HCJ 7052/03 Adalah. the Legal Center for Arab Minority Rights in Israel v.
the Minister of the Interior (May 14. 2006).
60. !d. at 'I 91-92 (Cheshin. 1.. majority opinion).
61. !d. at 'I 50--51 (Barak. C.J .. dissenting).
62. See Morton v. Mancari. 417 U.S. 535 (1974) (illustrating that preferences given
to Indians in hiring employees for the Bureau of Indian Affairs are not racial but
political). But see Graham v. Richardson. 403 U.S. 365.372 (1971) ("Classifications based
on alienage. like those based on nationality or race. are inherently suspect and subject to
close judicial scrutiny.").
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well as on their scope. Israel uses nationality to ban admission of
immigrants designated countries with which it is at war. The rule
applies to any immigrant, including family members, and it is
generally impossible to rebut the presumption of dangerousness
in individual cases. The United States uses nationality as an
immigration criterion in a broader sense- in admission
decisions, as in the case of nonimmigrant visitors from states
sponsoring terrorism, and in immigration enforcement, as in the
case of the NSEERS regulations. However, the U.S. policies do
not apply to family members and allow individuals to present
evidence that no real threat exists in their admission or stay in
the country."'
B. RELIGIOUS DISTINCTIONS

The use of religious distinctions has increased following the
September 11, 2001 attacks.(\.\ The 9/11 Commission found that
the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) failed to see
the nexus between immigration laws and national security and
failed to prevent the attacks. It failed to understand the high
stakes that were involved in admitting a foreign national without
a careful review of that person's background. The Commission
noted that "for terrorists, travel documents are as important as
weapons.""' In a challenge to post 9/11 detention policies aimed
at Muslims of Middle Eastern origin, the plaintiffs asserted
disparate treatment based on religion and national origin."" The
U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of New York
rejected the equal protection claim, holding that there is nothing
constitutionally impermissible in singling out nationals of
particular countries for increased enforcement. The Court
pointed to the reasonableness of giving greater scrutiny to
noncitizens "who shared characteristics with the hijackers, which
included sharing the same religion, as well as the same national

63. Orgad. supra note 27. at 95-101. 112-15.
64. See Susan M. Akram & Kevin R. Johnson. Race, Civil Rights, and Immigration
Law after September 1/, 2001: The Targeting of Arabs and Muslims. 58 N.Y.U. AN:-o.
SURV. AM. L. 295 (2002); Kevin R. Johnson & Bernard Trujillo. Immigration Reform,
National Security after September 1/, and the Future of North American Integration. 91
MINN. L. REV. 1369 (2007); Legomsky. supra note 43, at 163-77.
65. See THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE U:'<ITED
STATES 384-85 (2004).
66. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft. 2006 WL 1662663 (E.D.N.Y. 2006).
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origins ... [t]his approach may have been crude, but it was not
so irrational or outrageous. "li7
When the Department of Justice issued its NSEERS
registration rules in the summer of 2002, it explained that the
executive branches have to be given broad discretion to make
these distinctions. In Rajah v. Mukasey, the Second Circuit
upheld the registration requirement, aimed exclusively at
citizens of certain Muslim-dominated countries, under the
68
facially legitimate, bona fide standard. The Court held that it is
"plainly rational attempt to enhance national security" and
added:
To be sure. the Program did select countries that were, with
the exception of North Korea, predominantly Muslim.
Petitioners argue, without evidence other than that fact, that
the Program was motivated by an improper animus toward
Muslims. However, one major threat of terrorist attacks
comes from radical Islamic ~roups .... [t]he Program was
6
clearly tailored to those facts.

The Court noted that not all Muslims were made subject to
the registration requirements but only those from predominantly
Muslim countries. The Program also required non-Muslims from
designated countries to be subject to the registration. We thus
have the irony that even Jews who were born in one of the
designated countries, and who might well be subject to
persecution if they were to return to those countries, are subject
to the registration requirements. One could suggest that the
inclusion of non-Muslims was designed primarily to fend-off
criticism that the Program was directed solely against a certain
religion- that is, Islam. Indeed, the inclusion of non-Muslims
was a key factor in the Program being held constitutional.
Therefore, one must ask whether a registration program that
targeted ONLY Muslims would be acceptable under different
factual circumstances.
In a recent case, the U.S. Supreme Court has taken a similar
course. In this case, a Pakistani citizen of Muslim origin argued
that he was detained and tortured based on his Muslim
67. /d. at 132. The Second Circuit affirmed the decision. See Turkmen v. Ashcroft.
589 F.3d 542 (2nd Cir. 2009) (""Plaintiffs point to no authority clearly establishing an
equal protection right to be free of selective enforcement of the immigration laws based
on national origin. race. or religion ... ).
68. See Rajah v. Mukasey. 544 F.3d 427 (2d Cir. 2008).
69. /d. at 439.
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background. In a five to four decision. the Supreme Court ruled
that proving purposeful discrimination. the level needed under
the liability standard. means showing "'more than intent as
70
volition or intent as awareness of consequences. " It requires
that the decision maker adopted a policy '"not for neutral,
investigation reason," such as protecting national security, "but
for the purpose of discriminating on account of race, religion, or
71
national origin. " It means that a Muslim man must prove that
he was intentionally discriminated against because of his religion;
it is not considered unlawful discrimination if the religious traits
are merely incidental to a neutral investigation. At the end of its
opinion, the Court issued the following statement:'2
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab
Muslim hijackers who counted themselves members in good
standing of a! Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. AI
Qaeda was headed by another Arab Muslim-Osama bin
Laden-and composed in large part of his Arab Muslim
disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy
directing law enforcement to arrest and detain individuals
because of their suspected link to the attacks would produce a
disparate, incidental impact on Arab Muslims.

Justice Kennedy held that the religion of the petitioners is
merely an incidental impact of the War on Terror. In his view.
the Attorney General did not purposefully target Muslims
because of their religion, but because they "had potential
connections to those who committed terrorist acts. "'3 When one
applies this precedent to immigration, where the power of the
executive is plenary, it might be more difficult to exclude
religion distinctions when the policy is not motivated by
prejudice.
Religious distinctions are utilized in other countries as well.
In September 2005, the Minister of the Interior of the German
Land of Baden-Wi.irttemberg introduced a new citizenship test
intended to assess the loyalty of immigrants into the German
democratic basic order. Under this policy, such loyalty was
assessed through an interview in which the immigrant was asked
to reveal her personal beliefs on issues of equality, freedom of
religion, conversion, homosexuality, and culture. At the
70.
71.
72.
73.

See Ashcroft v. Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937.1940 (2009).
!d. at 1949.
/d. at 1951 (emphasis added).
/d.
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beginning, the test only applied to applicants from one of the
fifty-seven Member States of the Organization of the Islamic
74
Conference, or applicants "appearing to be Muslims."
Following criticism, the Muslims-only application had changed
to any apJ?lican~ ~'whose_ lo~alty to the G~rman Basic Law is
doubted."· Rehg10us cntena were also Implemented at the
German federal level. Following the 9/11 attacks, the Federal
Government employed a data mining system to expose terrorist
sleeper cells. About 300,000 persons were identified as potential
terrorists required to go through a closer inspection. The system
(Rasterfahndung) was founded on the screening of personal data
held by public and private institutions of every:
Male. aged 18 to 40. (ex- )student, Islamic religious affiliation,
native country or nationality of certain countries, named in
76
detail, with predominantly Islamic population.

The German 'terrorist profile' thus contained factors such
as age, gender and religion; being a Muslim was openly a
relevant criterion based on an alleged correlation between
Islamic religious affiliation and the tendency to terrorism. In a
landmark 2006 decision, the German Constitutional Court
invalidated the policy aimed predominantly against Muslims.
The Court found the policy to be unconstitutional, having a
stigmatizing impact against German Muslims, as long as religion
is the sole or the decisive criterion. Nevertheless, the decision
indicates that religious distinctions are not disqualified per se,
77
but only when religion is the decisive factor.
The religious background of immigrants was a sole criterion
of immigrant selection in neither Germany nor the United
States. But while in Germany religious criteria were explicit and
formal, the United States has claimed that religion had never
been an explicit immigration criterion but just an incidental
impact of the War on Terror. Perhaps this is one of the reasons
for its invalidation in Germany and approval in the United
States. Another difference is rooted in the different test used:
while the U.S. Supreme Court has examined intentions, the

74. See Islamic Human Rights Commission. The Ober-Citizen and German
Kulturkampf- s.lO German Naturalisation Law: A Front? (2007).
75. /d.
76. See Gabriele Kett-Straub. Data Screening of Muslim Sleepers Unconstitutional.
7 GERMAN L.J. 967.970 (2006).
77. /d. at 971-75.
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German Constitutional Court has also emphasized
importance of the policy's disparate racial impact.

the

C. RACIAL AND ETHNIC CLASSIFICATIONS
Is race a criterion for immigrant selection? In Jean v.
78
Nelson, the U.S. Supreme Court was confronted with the
question of whether the Government could deny parole to
Haitians fleeing their country, if the denials were race-based. 79
The plaintiffs had argued that black Haitians were being denied
entry while predominantly white Cubans were allowed to be
paroled into the United States. The majority declined to
answer that question, holding that the regulations governing
grants of parole were facially neutral. The majority remanded
the case to the lower court to decide whether the "raceneutral" regulations were being implemented without regard to
80
race or nationality. But what if the regulations were explicitly
race-based? Would they have passed constitutional muster? To
judge from a decision of the Second Circuit, race-based
regulations can survive judicial review. In Bertrand v. Sava, the
court examined the question whether an exclusion of Haitians
without parole constituted racial discrimination against blacks
and Haitians. Judge Cabranes recognized the power of the
government to exercise an unrestricted right to regulate
admission criteria, noting that "no one disputes [that] Congress
may employ race or national origin as criteria in determining
which aliens to exclude. " 81 That is because "the wide latitude
historically afforded to the political branches of our national
government in immigration matters permits them to adopt even
82
wholly irrational policies. " The Second Circuit cited with
approval the lower court's very sweeping pronouncement that
"constitutionally suspect or impermissible [criteria] in the
context of domestic policy, namely, race, physical condition,

78. 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
79. Parole is a term of art used in U.S. immigration law that refers to the
government's action in allowing an alien seeking entry to remain at liberty during the
adjudication of his case, as opposed to being detained while the case is decided.
80. The dissenting opinion refused to avoid the constitutional question of equal
protection and ruled that even though "national origin can sometimes be a permissible
consideration in immigration policy ... national origin (let alone race) cannot control
every decision in any way related to immigration." !d. at 881 (Marshall & Brennan JJ..
dissenting).
81. See Bertrand v. Sava, 684 F.2d 204, 213 (2d Cir. 1982).
82. /d.
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political beliefs, sexual proclivities, age, and national origin,"
83
can be permissible in immigration policy.
Although it is possible to find examples for using ethnic
criteria in U.S. immigration law, such as the NSEERS that
predominantly applied to citizens of Arab states, the use of
ethnicity is more common in other countries. One of its forms is
ethnic inclusion. Under Israeli law, people of Jewish ancestry
have an automatic right to enter Israel and become citizens.
While admission is possible in other cases as well-e.g., foreign
workers and asylum seekers-naturalization of non-Jews is
rarely granted, with the exception of non-Jewish family
members. Citizenship is generally granted onl~ to ethnic Jews,
that is, persons with a Jewish grandparent. Ethnicity is a
common criterion in Eastern Europe too. It is used for makin§
immigration preferences to noncitizens of certain ethnic groups. 5
Ethnicity plays a highly controversial role in the practice of
certain European countries. The British policy toward nationals
of Romani ethnic origin is an example. The Home Office
employed a policy aimed at stopping people seeking asylum
from boarding planes to Britain from the Czech Republic. But
while only 0.2 percent of non-Roma was denied entry, ninety
percent of Roma was barred. In addition, about eighty percent
of Roma were targeted for a secondary immigration interview
compared to less than one percent of non-Roma. Roma, thus,
were four hundred times more likely to be refused entry to
Britain than non-Roma. The British immigration authorities
officially employed discriminatory regulations under which:
The fact that a passenger belongs to one of these ethnic or
national groups will be sufficient to justify discriminationwithout reference to additional statistical or intelligence

83. /d. The court overruled the district court's decision, finding that the Attorney
General impermissibly discriminated on the basis of race and national origins. See Vigile
v. Sava. 535 F. Supp 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1982). But even the lower court noted that while it is
impermissible for a district director to apply racial criteria, "Congress may employ race
or national origin as criteria in determining which aliens to exclude." /d. at 1016. This
decision has never been explicitly overruled.
84. See general/v SHLOMO AVINERI, L!A V 0RGAD & AMNON RUBINSTEIN
MANAGING GLOBAL. MIGRATION: A STRATEGY FOR ISRAELI IMMIGRATION

POLIC~

(Ruth Gavison ed .. 2010).
85. See ALEXANDER Y AKOBSON & AMNON RUBINSTEIN, ISRAEL AND THE
FAMILY OF NATIONS: THE JEWISH NATION-STATE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 126-33 (2010).
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officer considers

such

The House of Lords held that U.K. immigration officers
were discriminating against Roma only because they were
Roma. Lord Steyn ruled that Roma were "discriminated on the
grounds of race" and, further, that the motive for this
87
discrimination is "irrelevant." The House of Lords noted that
"the law reports are full of examples of obviously discriminatory
treatment which was in no way motivated by racism." 88 The
decisive factor is therefore not intents, but effects.
Different types of racial and ethnic classifications appear
not only in law reports but also in official census. Some countries
record statistics according to ethnic origin (Caucasians, Asians,
Hispanic, etc.) and national origin (Cubans, Mexicans, etc.);
others apply different rules for different ethnic immigrants. In
Israel, for example, immigrants of Jewish origin are not
considered "immigrants" -they are returners (olim) who return
to their land. The rules that govern their entry are embodied in
The Law of Return, which grants them an almost automatic
admission. A separate ministry, the Ministry of Immigrant
Absorption, exists to provide them with generous financial and
social benefits. Unlike ethnic Jews, non-Jewish immigrants need
to go through a burdensome process, governed by the Entry into
Israeli Law and administered by the Ministry of the Interior. In
the Netherlands, official statistics distinguish between native
Dutch (allochtoon) and foreigners (allochtonen) and, unlike
other countries, also differentiate between Western and non89
Western foreigners. People of Dutch descent are Nederlanders
or autochthonous. In Germany, article 116 of the Constitution
embraces an ethnic definition of being German. It includes
ethnic Germans living outside Germany in Eastern Europe-if
coming to Germany they are resettlers- and Jews deprived their
citizenship under the Third Reich.'Xl In the United States, such
distinctions do not exist, though one's race could be defined,
86.

See Regina v. Immigration Officer at Prague Airport [2004) UKHL 55.
/d. at 36. Roma are actually an ethnic rather than a racial group. See Janko v.
Illinois State Toll Highway Auth., 704 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Ill. 1989).
88. /d. at 82.
89. See Evelyn Ersanilli, Netherlands, Country Profile 1-2 Focus MIGRATION
87.

(2007) ("Western allochtonen are people from Europe (excluding Turkey), North
America. Oceania. Indonesia and Japan; non-Western allochtonen are defined as people
from Turkey. Africa, Latin American and the rest of Asia.").
90. JOPPKE, supra note 5, at 182-88.
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albeit non-legally, by the "hyphen", that is, African-Americans,
Asian-Americans and Jewish-Americans.
So do race, religion and nationality matter in immigrant
selection? They surely do. In his compelling book, Joppke maps
out different types of ethnic selection in liberal democracies. He
shows how ethnic selection becomes more indirect than
straightforward, more peripheral than central, and more positive
than negative.~ Joppke's observations are well-established. One
will have a difficult time to find an openly racist policy of
excluding certain kinds of immigrants, such as the Chinese
Exclusion Act. It is also true that while ethnic criteria were
dominant in the past in one country's immigration policy, they
are generally subordinate today. The British policy toward
Roma and the German policy toward persons of Muslim descent
are the exceptions to the generally non-ethnic immigration
policies of those countries. Nevertheless, one should not think
that ethnic immigration classifications have disappeared. 92 As
this Part shows, they are still used in different contexts
(admission, enforcement, naturalization, removal), serve
different purposes (border security, cultural preservation), and
apply to different tyges of law enforcement strategies for
different time periods and regarding different types of aliens
(family immigrants, permanent residents, visitors).
The use of racial immigration criteria is strengthened by
three reasons. First, the War on Terror has revived immigrant
selection based on nationality and religion. Nationality-based
restrictions are increasingly considered to be a counter-terrorism
94
measure. Second, cultural tensions and theories about "clash of
civilizations" have accelerated the use of culture as a criterion of
immigrant selection. In his controversial book, Who Are We?,
Samuel Huntington called on Congress to adopt immigration
criteria aimed at preserving the so-called "Anglo-Protestant
9
culture. " ' Criteria of religion and culture have increasingly been
1

91. /d. at 219-50.
92. /d. at 219 (finding that the role of ethnicity in Western immigration policies
during the last decades '"has shrunk'" but not disappeared).
93. For the importance role of the time-limit of discriminatory immigration
provisions. see Daphne Barak-Erez. Terrorism and Profiling: Shifting the Focus from
Criteria to Effects. 29 CAR. L. REV. 1. 7 (2007).
94. THE NATIOI"AL COMMISSIOI" O;>.; TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED
STATES. supra note 65. at 385-90.
95. See generally SAMUEL HliNTINGTON. WHO ARE WE? THE CHALLENGES TO
AMERICA's NA TIOI"AL IDEI"TITY (2004 ).
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used as gatekeepers to oversee the quantity and quality of
immigrants, especially in Europe.% This raises a question: is
cultural exclusion the same as racial exclusion? Culture, very
often, is not "race-blind"; it has a disparate racial impact. Third,
countries use ethnicity as a means of immigrant inclusion more
than they used before. In Eastern Europe in particular, there is a
process of re-ethnicization under which nation-states grant
privileges to ethnic diaspora in admission and eligibility to
citizenship.
III. RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY: ARE THEY
LEGALLY PERMITTED?
Part II describes how, as a matter of policy. race. religion
and nationality still matter in the process of immigration
selection. Part III is normative: It explores whether the use of
such criteria is legally permitted. The question of what criteria
are permitted in immigrant selection depends not only on the
justification they serve-for the sake of the discussion. this Part
assumes that they serve a legitimate aim- but also on the
normative perspective. The question is whether race, religion
and nationality can ever be legitimate criteria provided that they
serve a legitimate purpose. This Part briefly discusses three
normative perspectives to analyze legitimate and illegitimate
immigration criteria: constitutional law, international human
rights law, and moral philosophy. Each approach imposes a
different set of constraints on states' power to decide who to let
.
d k eep out. 97
man

A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
In theory, the power to regulate immigration criteria is
restrained by the Constitution. In reality, however, the
possibility of applying constitutional standards to disqualifying
criteria of immigrant selection is either unavailable or available
to a lesser degree. Some reasons for this reality are rooted in
U.S. constitutional law: The limited application of the
Constitution outside the U.S. territory, the focus on intent rather
than effect, and the implied permission to use race-based
criteria. Other reasons relate to U.S. immigration law-a field
96. See Liav Orgad, Illiberal Liberalism: Cultural Restrictions on Migration and
Access to Citizenship in Europe. 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 53.63-83 (2010).
97. The described normative perspectives feed each other and often overlap.
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related to foreign affairs powers, in which judicial deference to
the executive is likely due to the plenary power doctrine.
Immigration rules, more than any other field, have been seen as
98
an "extraconstitutional area. "
First, the Constitution does not regularly apply to persons
located outside the territory. In an instructive book, with an
insightful title, Strangers to the Constitution,~ Gerald Neuman
shows how aliens outside the sovereign territory have usually
been considered outside the protections of the Constitution.
They may have claims under international or statutory law, but
the Constitution does not generally apply extraterritorially to
noncitizens and, therefore, does not provide substantive
constitutional protection to aliens outside the sovereign
territory.](xl
Second, constitutional law may provide little help to
immigrants even when the Constitution does apply to
immigration decisions, as in the cases of immigration
enforcement, naturalization or removal. In these cases, the
Constitution does apply within the U.S. territory yet its
protection is limited since the use of group-based criteria is
generally permissible in U.S. constitutional law. It usually
occurs when law enforcement agencies know enough data,
based on statistical patterns, about characteristics of a class of
crimes. They use deductive profiles to target J>otential
offenders by relying on a set of characteristics/ which,
although not a suspect-specific description, are considered a
good indicator for the tendency to commit certain crimes. 10'
The American NSEERS regulations, the Israeli statute on
family reunification, the German data mining system, and the
British immigration policy toward Roma were all based on
generalizations in which ethnicity, religion or nationality were a
98. See Legomsky. Immigration Law and the Principle of Plenary Power. supra
note 40. at 255.
99. See generally GERALD L NEUMAN. STRA!\IGERS TO THE CONSTJTUTJO:-<:
IMMIGRANTS. BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW ( 1996 ).
100. A consular denial of a visa is generally not judicially reviewable. See Bruno v.
Albright. 197 F.3d 1153. 1159-60 (D.C. Cir. 1999). Ventura Escamilla v. INS. 647 F.2d 28.
30 (9th Cir. 1981 ): Li Hing of Hong Kong. Inc. v. Levin. 800 F.2d 970. 971 (9th Cir. 1986 ):
Kleindienst v. Mandel. 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
101. See Wayne Petherick. The Role of Profiling in American Society: Criminal
Profiling: What's in a Name? Comparing Applied Profiling Methodologies. 5 J. L. & Soc.
CHALLENGES 173 (2003 ).
102. See generally FREDERICK SCHAUER. PROFILES. PROBABILITIES. A!\ID
STEREOTYPES (2003 ).
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proxy for predicting future behavior. But while the Israeli High
Court of Justice, the German Constitutional Court and the
British House of Lords found these policies to be racially
discriminatory, the U.S. Supreme Court declined to consider
such policies a Fourth Amendment violation. In Whren v.
United States, the U.S. Supreme Court held that race can
legitimately be used as long as other independent reasonable
factors exist. 10' The Court affirmed that "subjective intentions
play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment
analysis." 1 It noted that race claims must be addressed to the
105
Equal Protection Clause and, as a result. set the stage for a
permissible use of race to predict crimes-as long as race is
106
only one among other suspicion factors. During the 1970s, the
U.S. Supreme Court sustained the use of ''Mexican
appearance" in law enforcement along the Mexican border
inasmuch as it was not the sole factor for the decision. The
Court noted that "the likelihood that any given person of
Mexican ancestry is an alien is high enough to make Mexican
appearance a relevant factor, but standing alone it does not
justify stopping all Mexican-Americans to ask if they are
aliens. " 107 These cases indicate that the use of racial
immigration criteria, even in the U.S. territory. is a matter of
degree; it is not constitutionally forbidden in principle.
Third, in principle, U.S. constitutional law focuses more on
intent than effect. 108 Disparate impact alone is not determinative.
It is hard to prove a prima facie case of discrimination relying
solely on disproportionate statistic patterns. In Bertrand v. Sava,
the Second Circuit dismissed Haitians' claim of racial
discrimination based on highly disproportionate impact. The
Court noted that even if the test of disparate impact can be
applied in ''employment and housing." immigration is a different
().1

517 u.s. 806.813 (1996).
/d.
105. /d. ( .. The constitutional basis for objecting to intentionally discriminatory
application of laws is the Equal Protection Clause. not the Fourth Amendment").
106. /d.: see also United States v. Weaver. 966 F.2d 391 (8th Cir. 1992).
107. See United States v. Brignoni-Ponce. 422 U.S. 873. 886--87 (1975): see also
United States v. Martinez-Fuente. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). This conclusion. however. is not
clear-cut. See Chavez v. Illinois State Police. 251 F.3d 612. 635 (7th Cir. 2001): United
States v. Montero-Camargo. 208 F.3d 1122 (9th Cir. 2000): United States v. Avery 137
F.3d 343. 354-55 (6th Cir. 1997).
108. For the test of purposeful discrimination. see United States v Armstrong. 517
US 456.465 (1996): McCleskey v Kemp. 481 US 279.291-99 (1987): Washington v Davis.
426 us 229.239-41 (1976).
103.
104.
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field. 109 Thus, as Professor Neuman notes. if there is neither
racial motivation nor racial terminology in an immigration
statute, the statute might be constitutionally defensible. 11 ''
Focusing on intent to discriminate instead of disparate racial
impact is meaningful when nationality is used as a proxy for
racial exclusion. In Jean v. Nelson, Justice Marshall held that it is
generally unlawful to use race or national origin in immigration
discrimination yet supported nationality-based restrictions. ''For
better or worse," he declared, "nationality classifications have
111
played an important role in our immigration policy." Indeed,
scholars like David Martin and Gerald Neuman recognize the
use of nationality-based criteria in admission of noncitizens.
Martin argues that nationality is "closely related to genuine
foreign policy decisions.'' 112 while Neuman asserts that
"distinctions in federal law among aliens on the basis of their
country of current nationality are not constitutionally suspect ...
if these distinctions are not defined in terms of race and are not
motivated by racial prejudice. " 113 Yet. national ongm
discrimination is sometimes akin to racial discrimination.
Including Cubans while excluding Haitians is an example of a
policy, which, although grounded on nationality, is not raciallyneutral. U.S. constitutional law does not distinguish between
immigration criteria of race, ethnicity, religion. and nationality.
Nonetheless, citizens of countries such as China, Japan, Israel,
Mexico, Egypt, and Ireland do not share only nationality but
also a religion and ethnic origin. And yet, although nationalitybased discrimination may be permissible in immigrant selection,
the question of whether nationality can be used as a proxy for
racial discrimination in immigrant selection remains open.

109. Bertrand. 684 F.2d 204. 218 (2d Cir. 1982).
110. See Gerald L. Neuman. Terrorism, Selective Deportation. and the First
Amendment After Reno v. AADC. 14 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 313.340 (2000).
111. See Nelson. 472 U.S. 846. 864: see also Reno v. America-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee. 525 U.S. 471. 491 (1999) ("The Executive should not have to
disclose its ·rear reasons for deeming nationals of a particular country a special threat ...
even if it did disclose them a court would be ill equipped to determine their authenticity
and utterly unable to assess their adequacy.""): Romero v. INS. 399 F.3d 109 (2d Ci;.
2005) (upholding a program that awarded legal status to nationals of certain Central
American countries. but not to Mexican nationals. by pointing to broad plenary power to
regulate matters of immigration).
112. See David A. Martin. On Cowuerintuitive Consequences and Choosing the Right
Control Group: A Defense of Reno v. AADC. 14 GEO. 1\!MIGR. L.J. 363.364 (2000).
113. See Neuman. supra note 110. at 340.
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Proving intentional discrimination can be a more difficult
task in light of the case of Ashcroft v. Iqbal. In this case, as we
have seen in Part II, the U.S. Supreme Court upheld religiousbased discrimination as long as the policy does not purposefully
target against a specific religious group. Justice Kennedy ruled
that a law enforcement policy that produces a disparate impact
against Muslims is legitimate unless it has targeted Muslims
because, and only because, they are Muslims. 114
Fourth, the plenary power doctrine has largely removed
the immigration issue from U.S. constitutional law. especially on
entry decisions. The time-tested proposition is that "[i]n the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration,
Congress regularly makes rules that would be unacceptable if
applied to citizens." 11 ' This is due to the uniqueness of the
immigration field and its being interwoven with political
questions and foreign affairs powers. In principle, the use of
race, religion and nationality is more common in the context of
persons seeking admission. In this context, U.S. courts have
usually upheld the Government's broad scope of permissible
authority to base decisions on race. As Kevin Johnson has
written, race is central to the enforcement of U.S. immigration
116
law, particularly near the borders. Administrative policies are
entitled to deference, although courts may require a rational
basis showing to justify them. But when Congress passes an
immigration law, courts grant a wider degree of deference and
are inclined to find these laws constitutional. Nevertheless, one
must ask whether courts would uphold the constitutionality of an
immigration statute that clearly discriminates on the basis of
race or religion. Some critics of U.S. immigration policy, such as
Peter Brimelow, trace our woes to the 1965 Act that ended the
national origins quota system. 11 i Brimelow and like-minded
restrictionists openly call on Congress to pass laws that would
favor white Anglo-Saxon immigrants, and would bar the world's
unwashed from being able to enter the United States. Although
no court has explicitly held such discrimination to be a violation
of the equal protection principles, it is significant that at least
114. See Iqbal. 129 S. Ct. 1937.1940.1949-51 (2009).
115. See Mathews v. Diaz. 426 U.S. 67. 79-80 (1976): Knauff v. Shaughnessy. 338
U.S. 537. 544 (1950).
116. See Kevin J. Johnson. The Case Againsl Race Profiling In lmmigrlllion
Enforcemen/. 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675 (2000) .
.117. See generally PETER BRIMELOW. ALIEJ'\ NATION: CO\IMON SENSE ABOL"T
AMERICA ·s lMMIGRA TION DISASTER (1996 ).
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eight Supreme Court Justices have suggested that such
legislation would be impermissible (although never in one
opinion, and always in dissent). 11 s As no such legislation has
recently passed Congress, the closest we have come to a
definitive answer is the question posed by Justice Marshall in his
dissent in Jean v. Nelson. Justice Marshall rejected the possibility
that the government may discriminate on the basis of race "in
the absence of any reasons closely related to immigration
concerns. ,n 9 He admitted that a constitutional claim would fail
when it "lie[s] at the heart of immigration policy," and added
that "the individuality of the alien" is a factor only when "central
120
immigration concerns are not at stake." Yet, even Marshall's
dissent is far more modest than the absolute prohibition under
British law. In the Roma case, the House of Lords has ruled that
'"if a person acts on racial grounds, the reason why he does so is
121
irrelevant. "
As a policy matter, the Constitution may impose some baseline protections in admission cases. This may be the case if one
examines immigration issues through the lens of citizens' rights.
One example is the case of family migration, an issue that
touches upon not only interests of noncitizens, but also
constitutional rights of citizens, such as equal protection and
family life. One could argue, for example, that a regulation that
excludes family members on the basis of race or religion would
not pass constitutional muster due to its discriminatory effect on
American citizens. 122 As positive law, this route is not clear-cut.
U.S. courts have failed to recognize a fundamental right of

118. See Gabriel J. Chin. Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the
Constillltional Law of Immigration. 46 UCLA L. REV. I (1998). Chin points out that at
least nine federal circuit courts have suggested that racial classifications are "lawful per
se ... !d. at 33.
119. 472 U.S. 846.882.
120. !d. at 881.
121. Regina. UKHL 55 at 82.
122. See Kevin R. Johnson. Race, the Immigration Laws. and Domestic Race
Relations: A "Magic Mirror" into the Heart of Darkness. 73 IND. L.J. 1111. 1150-53
(1998): Linda Kelly. Preserving the Fundamental Right to Family Unity: Championing
Notions of Social Contract and Community Ties in the Baule of Plenary Power Versus
Aliens' Rights. 41 VILL. L. REV. 725 (1996): Hiroshi Motomura. Whose Alien Nation 7 :
Two Models of Constitutional Immigration Law. 94 MICH. L. REV. 1927. 1947 (1996):
Hiroshi Motomura. Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitwion. 97
COLUM. L. REV. 1567. 1572-73 (1997): Gerald M. Rosberg. The Protection of Aliens from
Discriminatory Treatment by the National Gm·ernment. SUP. CT. REV. 275. 326-27
(1977).
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American citizens to live together with noncitizen family
members. 12-'

B. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
International human rights law asks whether a policy
violates a protected right under international law and whether
this violation. if exists, is unlawful. At first glance. international
law seems to ban racial criteria. Article 1( 1) of the International
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination provides that:
··racial discrimination" shall mean any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference based on race, colour. descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or effect of
nullifying or impairing the recognition. enjoyment or exercise,
on an equal footing. of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the politicaL economic, sociaL cultural or any
12
other field of public life. ~

This clause is perhaps the broadest existing definition of
racial discrimination. It defines "race" broadly to include color,
descent ethnic and national origin- although not religion or
country of birth: it forbids any "distinction, exclusion, restriction
or preference" based on "race''; it outlaws any policy that has
racial purpose or effect; and it bans the use of "'race'' to deprive
rights. but also to ''impair the recognition, enjoyment, or
exercise, on an equal footing" of freedoms.
Applying international human rights law to an immigration
12
context is not an easy task. ' First, international law norms are
not always enforceable in domestic law. In the United States, for
example. individuals do not have self-executing rights not to be
126
discriminated against based on international conventions.
123. See. e.g. Fiallo v. Bell. 430 U.S. 787. 800 (1977). For a review. see Kif
Augustine-Adams. The Plenarr Power Doctrine After September 11. 38 U.C. DAVIS L
RE\·. 701.706-11 (2005).
124. See The International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial
Discrimination. 1965 60 U.N.T.S. 195 (1965) (henceforth: ··cERD").
125. This Part does not discuss rights derived from specific treaties. such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child. or regional treaties. such as the African Charter
of Human and Peoples· Rights.
126. The United States ratified the CERD with several reservations. One is that the
CERD is not self-executing. See generally Lori F. Damrosch. The Role of the United
States Senate Concerning 'Self-Executing' and ·.Von-Self-Executing' Treaties, 67 CHI.KE:--<T L RE\'. 515 ( 1991 ).
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Second, article 1(2) to the CERD makes clear that it does not
apply to distinctions between "citizens and non-citizens." Third.
article 1(3) to the CERD provides that it should not be
interpreted in any way to deprive States Parties' power on issues
of "nationality" and "citizenship or naturalization." provided
that the policies ''do not discriminate against any particular
nationality." In interpreting this clause. the U.N. Committee on
the Elimination of Racial Discrimination has recalled that
discrimination occurs only if the criteria "are not applied
pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional to the
achievement of this aim. ,m That is, racial discrimination may be
permissible under the CERD after fulfilling some conditions.
Indeed, the International Court of Justice held that
"international law leaves it to each State to lay down the rules
governing the grant of its nationality." 12" Fourth, article 1(1) to
the CERD defines racial discrimination only when it comes to
discrimination of "human rights and fundamental freedoms." As
Professor Legomsky noted, the question whether entry and
access to citizenship have become "human rights and
fundamental freedoms," which fall under the CERD's definition,
129
is at least controversial. And last, it is doubtful whether
admission criteria fall under the protection of the CERD.
International treaties usually apply within the state territory, or
130
to people subjecting to its jurisdiction. The European Court of
Human Rights ruled that under "international law, the
jurisdictional competence of a State is primarily territorial," and
that treaties are not "designed to be applied throughout the
world. ,m

While the use of racial immigration classifications is not
clearly impermissible under international law, the use of
nationality-based restrictions seems to be permissible. This
proposition is well-established. For example, in 1984, the Inter127. See Consideration of Reports Submitted by States Parties under Article 9 of the
Convention. UNITED NATI0:'-1. CERD/C/DEN/C0/17 (Oct. 19. 2006) (emphasis added).
128. See Liechtenstein v. Guatemala 1955 I.C.J. 4.
129. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 193-96.
130. See. e.g.. art. 2(1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.
1966. 999 U.N.T.S. 171: art. I of the European Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. art. 8. opened for signature Apr. 11. 1950. 213
U.N.T.S. 222.
131. See Bankovi v. Belgium. II BHRC 435 (2001 ). But see Ilascu v. Moldova. Eur.
Ct. H.R. 48787/99 (2004) (holding that international treaties apply wherever the state has
jurisdiction). It can be claimed. however. that the prohibition of racial discrimination is
part of customary international law.
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American Court of Human Rights ruled that preferences in
naturalization criteria issued by Costa Rica for nationals of
Central American countries, Spaniards and Ibero-Americans is
compatible with the American Convention on Human Rights
132
and presents no case of discrimination. The Court ruled that
"no discrimination exists if the difference in treatment has a
legitimate purpose and if it does not lead to situations which are
133
contrary to justice, to reason or to the nature of things. " The
Court justified granting preferences for Central American
nationals by noting that they are "closer historical, cultural and
spiritual bonds with the people of Costa Rica ... [Central
American nationals will] identify more readily with the
traditional beliefs, values and institutions of Costa Rica, which
134
the state has the right and duty to preserve." Similarly, the
European Court of Human Rights upheld nationality-based
distinctions when there is "an objective and reasonable
135
justification" in such a policy.
International human rights law limits states' power to
regulate immigration criteria. States' capacity to set up
immigration terms is more limited today than it was a few
decades ago. Yet, within the current international law regime,
states can still find new ways to restrict immigration based on
invidious distinctions. International human rights law rarely
136
interferes in regulation of immigration policy. And it does not
contain an explicit prohibition against racial discrimination in
immigration; on the contrary: it contains specific exemptions.
C. MORAL PHILOSOPHY: DISTRIBUTIVE AND CORRECTIVE
JUSTICE

States' power to regulate immigration can also be
restrained by the principle of justice, if not as a matter of
positive law at least on the basis of moral grounds. One
element of justice derives from the theory of distribute justice.
A proponent of domestic distributive justice asks to allocate
goods in a well-bounded political community; it presupposes a

132. See Advisory Opinion on the Proposed Amendments to the Naturalization
Provisions of the Political Constitution of Costa Rica (OC-4/84 ).
133. /d. para 57-60.
134. /d.
135. See C. v. Belgium, Eur. Ct. H.R. (1996).
136. Augustine-Adams. supra note 123. at 721-34.
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community. 1'" The decisive question is "'what is good for us"
(whatever the definition of "us" means). A proponent of global
distributive justice challenges the idea of domestic justice and
takes the view that goods are generally to be distributed
globally. In The Case for Open Borders, Carens makes a case
for global application of a Rawlsian theory of distributive
justice. 13s But while Rawls's theory is limited to a defined state,
Carens has doubts whether that is (or can be) morally justified.
The principle of justice may serve as a justification for
inclusion or exclusion of immigrants. A voiding the questions of
what are the goods needed to be distributed and how, 139 the
theory of justice says little about the criteria to distributive
justice. It indicates that immigration criteria may serve as a
device to mitigate global injustice and promote moral duties. In
this view, people should be allowed entry not because they have
a constitutional right, or a protected right under international
law, but due to a moral obligation. As long as one believes in
global distributive justice, ethnic criteria seem to be arbitrary
because everybody has an equal moral right to enter. 140 But as
long as global justice means utilizing immigration criteria as a
device for mitigate global inequalities-and inasmuch as one
believes that this is a justified purpose -one might argue that
ethnic criteria should play a role when one can identify certain
ethnic classes in need. True, justice should usually be blind to
one's class and be race-neutral. Justice is about individuals:
"from each, according to his ability, to each, according to his
need," to quote Marx. Nonetheless, in deciding one's ability and
needs, countries may use one's status. Some societies have more
goods while others have more needs, and these societies
frequently have ethnic characteristics. The justification of the
criterion derives here from the justification of the end it serves.

137. See Stephen Macedo. The Moral Dilemma of U.S. Immigration Policy: Open
Borders Versus Social Justice. in DEBATING IMMIGRATION 63 (Carol M. Swain ed ..
2007): RAWLS. supra note 13. at 18: WALZER. supra note 22. at 31. 61--D2.
13R See Carens. supra note 16. at 234.
139. A great contribution on the question of who owes whom what has been made
by Stephen Macedo. See Macedo. supra note 137. at 70. 75-76: Stephen Macedo. What

Self-Governing Peoples Owe to One Another: Universalism, Diversity, and the Law of the
Peoples. 72 FORD. L. REV. 1721 (2004).
140. An open door policy might. on the other hand. impoverish sending countries
and might cause serious brain-drain problems there. See MEETING THE CHALLENGES OF
GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT: A LONG-TERM STRATEGIC EXERCISE FOR THE WORLD BANK
GROl'P 22 (2007).
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Another element of justice stems from one of the principles
underlying tort law-corrective justice. Under this view, states
need to take into account past wrongs in deciding what policy to
adopt. Corrective justice emphasizes past behavior of the parties
in order to impose future liability. In the immigration context,
one example is the pattern of European states in granting
preferential treatment by issuing visas, residence permits and
citizenship status to people from former colonies: Algerians in
France; Indonesians, Moluccans and Surinames in the
Netherlands; and Sub-Saharan Africans in the UK. 141 True, there
were selfish economic reasons for these privileges, but one
justification was a redress for past wrongs. 142 Another example is
the German welcoming treatment of Jewish immigrants from the
Former Soviet Union during the 1990s, and the preferential
treatment given to Samoans to settle in New Zealand under the
Samoan Quota Scheme. In these cases, special ethnic
immigration treatment is given partly or wholly as reparation for
past exploitation.
Countries sometimes grant preferential treatment to their
ethnic diaspora. Both the Finnish preferential immigration
treatment toward Karelians and the Turkish policy toward
Ahisha Turks from the F.S.U. have been justified on the basis of
143
past sufferings under the communist regime. Redress for past
injustice is one of the justifications of the Israeli Law of Return,
granting automatic entry to every Jewish immigrant. Asa Kasher
justifies this law by invoking the doctrine of affirmative action.
In his view. ethnic groups deprived of their right to selfdetermination are entitled, as a temporary remedial policy, to
favor ethnic diaspora. 144 Here, again, the justification of the
criterion derives from the justification of the end. Yet, a justified
end should not lead to an automatic conclusion that the criterion
is justified. The justification of the criterion stems from other
sources as well. The use of racial criteria may have direct or
indirect influence on other people. For example, favoring Jewish
immigrants in Israel may be a justified end in light of Jewish
history, nonetheless the justification of the criterion of Jewish

141.
93-111.
142.
143.
144.
Refilm.

For the French and British postcolonial policies. see JOPPKE. supra note 5. at
144-56.
!d.
For a detailed review. see Y AKOBSON & RUBINSTEIN. supra note 85. at 126--33.
See Asa Kasher. Justice and Affirmative Action: Naturalization and the Law of
15 !SR. Y.B. HCM. RTS. 101 (1985).
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descent is influenced by other factors. Chaim Gans explains that
ethnic preferences in immigration selection in Israel are not
morally wrong as long as they do not cause injustice to other
ethnic group residing in Israel."' This view distinguishes between
criteria and ends. Still, one may challenge these arguments: the
Israeli Law of Return- and, to a certain extent, the German
preferential policy toward ethnic German repatriates from
Eastern Europe- is not a classic case of corrective justice.
Neither Israel nor Germany can compensate for wrongs done by
another party. Yet corrective justice theories indicate that
immigration criteria can often depart from the past. As past
wrongs are often collective in nature and were aimed against
specific ethnic groups, immigration criteria may reflect such
criteria as well.
A long time has passed since the Chinese Exclusion Case
yet racial classifications are still with us, not just as a matter of
policy but also as good law. True, there are more barriers and
strict conditions to fulfill, but, as a general rule, racial
immigration criteria have not yet been excluded per se. The key
question is whether this law can be justified. This question is
complex. The conclusion surely depends on the justification the
criteria serve. Unlike other scholars, we do not offer a 'blackand-white' answer of clearly permissible and clearly
146
impermissible criteria.
Rather, we offer a context-based
approach.
IV. RACE, RELIGION AND NATIONALITY:
ARE THEY COST EFFECTIVE?
This Part discusses the use of racial immigration criteria in a
specific context as a case study. It challenges the use of race,
ethnicity and religion in the process of immigrant selection and
in the context of the U.S. War on Terror. The discussion is
limited to that context. The argument is based on utilitarian
grounds. It is neither because other grounds do not support our
case nor because they are less important or weaker, but merely
because the strongest justification for the use of racial
classifications in this context has been based on utilitarian
145. See CHA!M GANS. THE LIMITS OF NATIO]';ALISM 138-39 (2003). Gans, however.
supports ethnic-based inclusion (and exclusion) mainly under a concept of what he calls
"sub-state's self-determination ...
146. See Carens. supra note 11. at 104--05 (race. religion and ethnicity are always
impermissible criteria).
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grounds. Although effectiveness is not the only or the most
important factor in the legal analysis, it is surely a preliminary
one. The use of race is premised on its being an effective method
to serve a legitimate end, such as protecting public safety. If this
proposition is false, than the justification for using the criterion
becomes weaker. This Part argues that racial immigration
selection often lacks statistical validity, is not cost effective, and
is likely to be over-inclusive and far in excess of its potential
contribution due to cognitive biases and heuristic judgments.
A. STATISTICAL CORRELATION
In a recent article, Professor Legomsky asserts that any
race-based immigration use must meet two requirements:
147
rationality and justifiability. Legomsky argues that the relevant
inquiry under the rationality requirement should not be what
percentage of the targeted group are terrorists. Rather, it should
be what percentage of the terrorists are members of the targeted
148
group. If the percentage is higher compared to other groupsit is less clear how higher it must be-the policy is rational due to
its correlation between the traits and terrorism. 149
Legomsky makes a policy argument yet rationality is a legal
requirement as well. Under international human rights law,
racial discrimination occurs whenever racial immigration criteria
do not serve a legitimate aim, or are not proportional to the
achievement of this aim- that is, among others, do not rationally
serve the aim. 150 In U.S. constitutional law, at least two
perspectives exist. On the one hand, if one believes that the
Executive Branch should have plenary power when it comes to
immigration, especially in admission cases where the
Constitution generally does not apply abroad, one may conclude
that no correlation is needed. On the other hand, if one believes
that the Executive owes some obligations in the field of
immigration-if not to immigrants, at least to citizens whose
interests may be harmed in cases of immigration restrictionsthen one may conclude that some correlation is needed. As
positive law, there is a circuit split on the required degree of

147.
148.
149.
150.

Legomsky. supra note 43. at 177-79.
!d. at 180-81.
!d.
See supra note 127 and accompanying text.
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correlation: Some courts have applied a rational basis test while
1 1
others asked for intermediate scrutiny. '
Does a correlation between racial traits and terrorism exist?
The government's strongest case for using racial classifications in
immigration policy is premised on efficiency. However, a closer
look reveals some empirically false propositions. On the
statistical level, proving a statistical correlation between racial
criteria and certain crimes is far from simple. When the U.S.
government issued the NSEERS registration rules, the
justification was the alleged statistical relationship between
certain criteria and terrorism (the hijackers were all Muslim
Arab men from the Middle East). Harvard Law Professor Alan
Dershowitz stated that it would be foolish to fight against
terrorism "by devoting equal attention to interrogating an
eighty-year-old Christian woman from Maine and a twenty-twoyear-old Muslim man from Saudi Arabia." 152 Dershowitz's
argument is based upon the assumption that terrorists are more
likely to be found in specific groups sharing similar
characteristics. However, in order not to be spurious, the
assumption requires more than just showing that all the hijackers
shared certain characteristics. One needs to present a statistical
relevance between these characteristics and terrorism.
In many of the cases discussed in this Article, it is doubtful
whether the U.S. government was able to justify its policies on
statistical grounds. The profile was at least over-inclusive. For
example, the NSEERS scheme listed twenty-four Muslimmajority countries with no correlation between the nationality of
each of the listed nationalities- Algerian, Eritrean, Jordanian,
etc.-and the propensity to engage in terrorism. It is also unclear
whether the government's contention was to demonstrate a
correlation between terrorism and certain nationalities, or
between terrorism and a specific religion-with nationality only
used as a pretext. To judge from the list of the designated
countries, the focus was one's religion. Excluding North Korea,
the list included twenty-four predominantly Muslim countries.
Yet, the fact the list excluded other predominantly Muslim
countries-the Organization of the Islamic Conference
enumerates fifty-seven member states-may indicate that the

151. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
152. See Ken Gewertz. Balancing Act: Civil Liberties and Security, HARV. GAZETTE
NEWS. Dec. 13. 2001.
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targeted group was a mix-and-match of religion and nationality.
It pretended to be a quasi-scientific list of high-risk groups. But
the claim that specific groups are more likely to become
terrorists is an empirical proposition that requires establishing a
correlation between the criteria and terrorism at a level that
justifies inadmissibility.
If history teaches anything about race-based statistics, it is a
duty to be skeptical of their credibility. One example from a long
list is the "list of races and peoples," issued by the U.S.
Government on July 1, 1898. The story of the list is described by
Patrick Weil. 153 The list divided immigrants into forty-two races,
organized by five categories: Teutonic division from Northern
Europe, Celtic division from Western Europe, Iberic division
from Southern Europe, Slavic division from Eastern Europe,
and Mongolic division. Its aim was to determine the capacity of
different racial groups to integrate into the American society.
All immigrants had to indicate their race and nationality and
these factors served to decide their eligibility. The list was finally
154
proven to be statistically erroneous, but it is one illustration of
a long history of hysteria and panic directed at some immigrant
groups (Chinese, Germans, Irish, etc.), which proved to be
fallacious, though these groups were initially seen by some to
represent a threat.
The question of correlation between racial immigration
criteria and terrorism is context-based. In the 1970s, the U.S.
Supreme Court upheld the use of ''Mexican appearance" in
immigration enforcement along the Mexican border. To support
its conclusion, the Court referred to the statistic according to
which "85% of the aliens illegally in the country are from
Mexico." 155 This percentage was doubtful even in the 1970s (it is
surely doubtful today), 156 but the question is what correlation the
Court was trying to prove: was it between "Mexican
appearance" and being an "illegal alien"? Was "Mexican
appearance" an indicator of being a "Mexican national"? How
Weil, supra note 41, at 627-38.
I d. at 647-48. The list was completely abandoned in 1952. !d. at 638.
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 879 (1975). More accurately. the
Court's conclusion was a combination of a general and a specific correlation. The Court
found a general correlation. regardless of the circumstances. between "Mexican
appearance" and being an "illegal alien." But it also referred to a circumstantial
correlation because the person was stopped "near to the Mexican border." ld. at 873.
153.
154.
155.

877.
156.

Johnson, supra note 116. at 694-95.

2010]

IMMIGRA T/ON SELECTION

277

much correlation is required to establish a statistical relationship
between religion and terrorism in an immigration context?
These questions remain open though they are crucial to the legal
analysis.
The use of appearance as a criterion in immigration
enforcement requires a double correlation. In a recent case,
involved ethnic profiling at JFK airport, the government
asserted that "Middle Eastern appearance" is a relevant factor in
a probable cause calculus because "all of the persons who
participated in the 9/11 terrorist attacks were Middle Eastern
males. " 157 This reasoning requires proving a correlation between
"Middle Eastern appearance" and being an Arab or a Muslim,
and between the latter and terrorism. It may even require a
triple correlation since the term "Middle Eastern appearance" is
vague and law enforcement officials often use other criteriasuch as language, accent or dress code-to identify one's
appearance. In the realm of likelihoods and probabilities, agents
are not always familiar with the nuances of different religions
and sects, and there is an inherent tendency toward confusion.
Proving such correlation is not an easy task. As the Court held in
this decision: "no court has ever marshaled statistics to conclude
that racial or ethnic appearance is correlated with, and thus
prob_ativ~ of,_ an_y t~g,; of cri_min_al condu~t other_ than
ImmigratiOn vwlatwns. · In phrasmg Its conclusiOn by usmg the
exception of "other than immigration violations," the Court
asked to isolate immigration from other fields. However, even
the Brignoni-Ponce case about Mexican appearance is contextbased and not a carte-blanche invitation to use racial criteria.
At minimum,_ as Professor Le_goms~l noted,_ th~ required
degree of correlatiOn has to be ratiOnal. · The pomt IS not that
it is entirely irrational to employ racial immigration
classification, but rather that the picture is more complex than
seen at first glance. We lack sufficient evidence to provide
157. See Farag v. United States. 587 F. Supp. 2d. 436 (E.D.N.Y. 2008).
158. /d.; see also A1-ery. 137 F.3d 343.354 (""[A]lthough the Court in Brignoni-Ponce
stated 'the likelihood that any given person of Mexican ancestry is an alien is high
enough to make Mexican appearance a relevant factor." we refuse to adopt. by analogy.
the concept that 'the likelihood that any given person of African ancestry is involved in
drug trafficking is high enough to make African ancestry a relevant fact' in investigating
drug trafficking.··).
159. The test of rationality may apply differently to different immigration contexts.
The level of rationality might be stricter. for example. in cases of removal compared to
admission.
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clear-cut conclusions, but from the available data it is at least
possible to question whether such a correlation exists. 1611
Furthermore, just because two things are correlated, does not
mean that one causes the other. A correlation simply means
that a relationship exists between two factors, but tells us
nothing about the direction of this relationship. For instance.
one may find that the 9/11 hijackers were all thin: Will someone
seriously consider taking immigrants' weight into account in
targeting future terrorists based on statistical correlation
between weight and terrorism?
B. COST EFFECTIVENESS

A statistical relation, in itself, does not indicate that using
certain criteria is also effective. To be cost effective. the overall
benefits of the criteria should outweigh their overall costs. On
the benefit side, one needs to prove that race effectively serves a
legitimate interest to a degree that justifies its use. What must be
assessed is not the efficiency of the system as a whole, but the
incremental benefit derived from the additional use of race to the
process of immigration selection. On the cost side, using racial
criteria may yield some costs: human rights violations along with
social costs, such as stigmatization of racial groups and creating
hostility. 161 Imposing costs on certain groups may be seen as
stigmatization of citizens who belong to such groups. 1"c What
must be assessed, again, is the incremental cost derived from the
163
use of race in immigrant selection. As Legomsky noted in
referring to the second requirement of justifiability, any gain in
law enforcement efficiency have to be balanced against the
serious
harms
inherent
in
government-sponsored

160. See. e.g .. Leti Volpp. The Citizen and the Terrorist. 49 UCLA L. REV. 1575
(2002).
161. See PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETIE N. KAYYEM. PROTECTING LIBERTY l"i
AN AGE OF TERROR 106-07 (2005) (the costs of nationality profiling "will keep members
of families apart ... individuals [and] employers may mimic what the government is
doing. justifying their own profiles based on the lessons of government conduct. even if
the government's profiling is limited in scope and context ... it will engender serious rifts
between persons who could provide helpful information . . . [it] may have serious
consequences for our relations abroad . . . [it] would be both unfair and likely
unhelpful.").
162. See Johnson. supra note 122. at 1150-53: Legomsky. supra note 43. at 183:
Motomura. supra note 122. at 1572-73: Rosberg. supra note 122. at 326-27: Volpp. supra
note 160, at 1592-98.
163. See Mathias Risse & Richard Zeckhauser. Racial Profiling. 32 PHIL. & PL'B.
AFF. 131 (2004).
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discrimination. 104 It does not mean that cost effectiveness ts
sufficient in order to justify the policy, only that it is a
preliminary requirement.
Making a cost-benefit analysis of using immigration criteria
is a lofty goal and, without reliable data, an almost impossible
task. It is hard to gauge how effective the NSEERS registration
rules were, or to assess their costs. Are racial criteria a
preemptive means, aimed at maximizing 'hit rates' of putative
terrorists, or deterrence-based? We have no data on both
aspects, but it is worth mentioning that the NSEERS regulations
yielded not even one arrest from among thousands of targeted
persons. 16' In addition, one needs to take into account the
displacement effect. Terrorists often change methods and
techniques and accommodate changes in immigration policies.
They may declare a different religion, or use a different passport,
or recruit non-profiled group members. Timothy McVeigh, who
bombed the building in Oklahoma City, was a Catholic
American. John Walker Lindh, Eric Rudolph, Jose Padillawere all Americans. Richard Reid, the "shoe bomber," was
British. Moreover, targeting only specific groups may even be
counterproductive. To learn from a different case, the U.S.
Customs Service published a study that compares the results of
searches at airports using a group-based method to the results of
searches at the same airports using a random method. The study
reveals that conducting a random search yields a substantially
higher "hit rate. " 166 Although African American women were
more frequently searched, they were by far less likely than white
American women or men to carry contraband.
The questions needed to be asked are how effective is the
use of the criterion, and for what price. The state must balance
potential benefit with cost as a preliminary legal requirement,
though it may be reasonable to require a different level of
efficiency for different immigration contexts and regarding
167
different infringed rights and trade-offs. Yet in the empirical
debate, it is not only hard to find reliable data to evaluate the
164. Legomsky. supra note 43. at 178.
165. Similarly. the German Rasterfahndung yielded not even one arrest from among
300.000 targeted people. See Kett-Straub. supra note 76. at 971.
166. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Customs Service: Better Targeting of
Airline Passengers for Personal Searches Could Produce Better Results (2000).
167. See Nelson. 472 U.S. 846. 881 ('"That the Executive might properly admit into
this country many Cubans but relatively few Haitians does not imply that. when dealing
with aliens in detention. it can feed Cubans but not feed Haitians."").
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right trade-off, but even based on the same data it is possible to
reach different empirical conclusions.
C. HEURISTIC JUDGMENT
A third issue stems from the psychological human tendency
to use racial criteria beyond what their actual predictive
contribution justifies. Amos Tversky and Nobel Prize winner
Daniel Kahneman present three cognitive biases that stem from
the phenomenon of heuristic judgment: representativeness
heuristic, availability heuristic, and adjustment heuristic. 10/l The
first bias describes situations in which people assume that
individual A belongs to group B by assessing similarity between
A to B based on how closely they resemble each other. The
judgment is often based on stereotypes that ignore what the
169
authors call "base-rate frequency," or "prior probability." For
instance, a description according to which "Steve is very shy and
withdrawn, invariably helpful, but with little interest in people"
leads some to believe that Steve is a librarian and not a
salesman, a pilot or a farmer. The description of Steve fits the
stereotype of librarians more than the other occupations; people
use the "most-likely-strategy" to attach A (Steve) to group B
(librarians). This conclusion, however, is a statistical error. It
ignores the prior probability under which there are more
salesmen, farmers and pilots than librarians in the population
and, hence, it is statistically more likely that Steve is not a
170
librarian.
In the wake of the 9/11 attacks, U.S. Attorney General John
Ashcroft ordered questioning 5,000 Muslim Middle Eastern
young men who legally resided in the United States. Ashcroft
explained the policy by noting that this group is likely to be
171
thinking about committing a crime. When one incorporates
base-rate frequency, this observation can be seen differently.
Even if eighty percent of terrorism was committed by members
of group Z, the likelihood that a member of group Z is a terrorist
168. See Amos Tverskv & Daniel Kahneman. Judgment Under Uncertainly:
Heuristics and Biases. in JUD.GMENT UNDER UNCERTAINLY: HEL"RISTICS AND BIASES 3
(Daniel Kahneman. et al. eds .. 1982). Tversky and Kahneman show how judgment of
probability leads to errors since it ignores considerations of base-rate frequency that
must influence the outcome.
169. /d. at 4-11.
170. /d.
171. See Memorandum from the Deputy Attorney General to all United States
Attorneys and all Members of the Anti-Terrorism Task Forces (Nov. 9. 2001 ).
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should consider group Z's percentage of the population and the
percentage of terrorists among the population. If group Z
constitutes 5 percent of the population, and terrorists constitute
0.1 percent of the population, the likelihood that a member
among group Z would be a terrorist is 0.8 x 0.00110.05 ( =0.016).
This probability is higher than the probability that a nonmember of group Z is a terrorist, which in our example is
0.001-some would say significantly higher because it is sixteen
times more likely to be a terrorist-but is still a very small
percentage. Therefore, the Attorney General's conclusion was
wrong as long as it indicated that Muslim Middle Eastern men
are likely to become involved in terror, but right as long as it
indicated that a member of this group is more likely than a nongroup member to become involved in terror.
In a recent article, Kip Viscusi and Richard Zeckauser
present an interesting view of how people psychologically
evaluate risks. Viscusi and Zeckauser surveyed students at
Harvard Law School, Harvard Kennedy School of Government
172
and Wharton Business School on their risk beliefs. One of the
findings indicates that risk assessment is far from being an
objective process. People (even educated students) are prone to
evaluate risks less on probabilities and more based on personal
preferences and subjective perceptions. They tend to put the
focus on the "severity of the outcome than on the probability
that it will occur." 173 People tend to think on the catastrophic
result of a mistake rather than on its probability. Viscusi and
Zeckauser referred to another important point: the
psychological interweaving of values and probabilities. ''Values
and probability assessments are often linked" and, hence, "those
who think caRital punishment is immoral also tend to think of it
1 4
ineffective." They concluded that in risk assessments people
often rely on biases and irrational judgments that eventually
might cause empirical errors.
Even before analyzing legal and moral issues involved, it is
possible to challenge some race-based immigration criteria on
utilitarian grounds. This Part demonstrates that what might seem
to be a cost-effective policy is not necessarily so in the context of
the War on Terror because the use of race tends to be over172. See W. Kip Viscusi & Richard J. Zeckauser. Recollection Bias and the Combat
of Terrorism. 34 J. LEG. STUD. 27 (2005).
173. !d. at 47.
174. /d.

282

CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY

[Vol. 26:237

inclusive, disregards costs, and involves psychological biases. The
question that we will briefly discuss in the next section is
whether other alternative methods for immigrant selection exist.
We present four such methods: universal selection, positive
selection, random selection and racial selection with just
compensation.
V. ALTERNATIVE METHODS OF IMMIGRANT
SELECTION
As a policy matter, as Part II shows, the power of Congress
and the Executive to decide whom to admit, and under which
terms, has largely remained plenary. In certain circumstances, as
Part III demonstrates, racial immigration classifications may be
legally permitted under different perspectives. Yet. as Part IV
presents, there are some utilitarian grounds to challenge this
reality in the context of the U.S. War on Terror. Part V focuses
now on alternative methods. It presents four alternatives of how
to select immigrants. The purpose is not to make a case for one
of them but rather to stimulate a debate on other methods of
immigrant selection. Part V also shows why, in spite of some
salient differences, none of these methods is racially-neutral.
A. TOWARDS A TYPOLOGY OF IMMIGRATION SELECTION

It is possible to distinguish between four cases of immigrant
selection. The first case occurs when an immigration policy seeks
17
to achieve a racial purpose by using racial criteria. ' An example
is the Chinese Exclusion Act aimed at excluding Chinese by
17
using Chinese descent as a criterion. " Another example is the
National Origin Quota System. which governed U.S.
immigration law from 1921 to 1965, whose purpose was, inter
alia, to maintain the ethnic status quo of the U.S. population by
using nationality-based criteria. In a way, one can consider the
ethnic immigration preferences under German and Israeli law as
fall within this category, as long as the purpose is keeping
Germany for "Germans" and preserving Israel as a Jewish state.
175. The term ··race·· is used in this Part as an umbrella category to describe race.
ethnicitv and religion.
176. · A note of limitation: One might claim that Chinese exclusion was not aimed at
achieving a racial purpose but a non-racial purpose of better integration: . racial
hegemony was only a means to an end. such as promoting the social cohesion. Th1s Part
does not deal with historical aspects of such cla1ms. or w1th the1r normatlve aspects that
relate stable societies to racial hegemony.
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The second case occurs when an immigration policy seeks to
achieve a racial purpose by using some facially-neutral criteria.
States may use non-racial criteria- such as culture, skills,
education or income-in order to exclude certain nationals.
177
Because nationality is sometimes tied with race -exclusion of
Chinese citizens is also exclusion of Asians; excluding Israelis
may result in excluding some Palestinians. but the vast majority
of people excluded will be Jews- the outcome may have racial
17
implications. " In this case, non-racial criteria are strategically
designed to achieve a racial purpose, though they may also end
up with the exclusion of other groups who share similar
characteristic. Thus, states might be willing to "lose" inclusion of
some groups in order to "gain'' exclusion of some other groups.
The third case occurs when an immigration policy seeks to
achieve a non-racial purpose by using racial criteria. An example
is when states impose nationality-based restrictions during war.
The criterion of nationality here is not driven by, or aimed at, a
racial purpose, but rather is intended to achieve a non-racial
purpose of protecting national security. The assumption here is
that there is a connection between enmity and nationality.
Another example is temporal exclusion of Asian citizens due to
fear of SARS. The goal here is protecting the public health, not
excluding Asians. As Stephen Macedo asserts, immigration rules
that used racial criteria. did not always ask to achieve a racial
purpose; for example, ''while the animus against Irish Catholics
was indeed based partly on race prejudice, there were more
substantial and honorable grounds for worrying that the
teachings of the Roman Catholic Church before Vatican II were
inconsistent with liberalism." 179

177. See Saint Francis College v. Al-Khazraji. 481 U.S. 604. 613-14 (1987) (Brennan.
J.. concurring) ("The line between discrimination based on ancestry or ethnic
characteristics ... and discrimination based on ·place or nation of [origin( ... is not a
bright one ... often. however. the two are identical as a factual matter: one was born in
the nation whose primary stock is one's own ethnic group.").
178. A report released by Yale Law School found that although the DHS had used
nationality as a criterion. seventy-nine percent of the foreign nationals investigated came
from Muslim-majority countries. Citizens from Muslim-majority countries were in fact
1.280 times more likely to be targeted than other nationals. See Eric Lichtblau. Inquiry
Targeted 2,000 Foreign Muslims in 2004. N.Y. TiMES. Oct. 30. 2008.
179. See STEPHEi\ MACEDO. DIVERSITY Ai\D DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCAT!Oi\ IT\
MLLTICL'LTCRAL DEMOCRACY 130 (2000). Macedo asserts that "it would be wrong to
attribute the civic anxieties of this period to racism alone ... there were also civic. secular
reasons for fearing that an education in orthodox Catholicism could be hostile to
republican attitudes and aspirations ... /d. at 63.
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The fourth case occurs when an immigration policy seeks to
achieve a non-racial purpose by using facially-neutral criteria.
States may use criteria such as education or income or skills for
civic purposes, such as increasing economic efficiency. The
policy here is intended to serve some facially-neutral national
interests.
The challenge in this typology is to separate the legitimate
from the illegitimate immigration policies. At first glance, one
might think that it is generally illegitimate to use racial criteria to
achieve a racial purpose, and that it is generally legitimate to use
facially-neutral criteria to achieve a non-racial purpose. As Part
III shows, this is not always the case. The question of legitimate
and illegitimate criteria depends on the perspective, the context,
and the purpose it serves. On the one hand, there are cases in
which ethnic preferences in immigration inclusion may be
considered as a legitimate policy, even if they serve, to some
extent, an ethnic purpose. On the other hand, facially-neutral
criteria that are employed to achieve a non-racial purpose may
have racial disparate impact that can violate human rights. At
the end, the justification of the criteria derives, first and
foremost, from the justification of the end they intended to
serve.
Two possible tests exist to distinguish between legitimate
and illegitimate criteria. The first test focuses on motivation. A
policy that is racially-motivated (whatever the procedure to
explore motivation is) would be generally considered as
illegitimate, whereas a policy that has non-racial motivation
would be generally considered as legitimate. This is the test of
intentional discrimination. As articulated by Justice Scalia: ''No
matter how closely tied or significantly correlated to race the
explanation for a peremptory strike may be, the strike does not
implicate the Equal Protection Clause unless it is based on race.
That is the distinction between disproportionate effect, which is
not sufficient to constitute an equal protection violation, and
1
intentional discrimination. which is. " ""
The second test focuses on impact. A policy that has a
racially disparate impact on a state's members (or, under a
cosmopolitan view, on any group) would be generally considered
illegitimate. whereas a policy that does not have
disproportionate racial effect would be generally considered
JRO.

See Hernandez v. New York. 500 U.S. 352.377 (1991) (Scalia J.. concurring).
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legitimate. This test was implemented by the British House of
Lords and the Israeli Supreme Court. 1H1 It is also a wellestablished test under international human rights law. which
distinguishes between direct racial discrimination- that is,
differential treatment based on racial criteria- to indirect racial
discrimination- differential treatment based on non-racial
criteria that puts some racial groups at a disadvantage compared
to other groups. 1K2 To be clear. differentiation does not mean
discrimination let alone unlawful discrimination. The criterion
might be seen as illegitimate because of racial motivation or
racial effect, but can still be lawful due to other legitimate
interests involved.
In the next sections, we analyze four methods of how to
select immigrants- universal selection, positive selection,
random selection and racial selection with just compensation -in
light of the above two tests distinguishing between legitimate
and illegitimate immigration criteria.
B. UNIVERSAL SELECTION

A first option is to select immigrants based on "'universal"
criteria, i.e., criteria that do not directly discriminate on the basis
of race. These may be ascribed characteristics, such as one's
gender, or achieved characteristics, such as one's education,
occupation or wealth. Almost every liberal democracy has such a
system. The United States, for example, gives priorities to family
immigrants over other immigrants and to immediate relatives
over other family members. These preferences rely on the
importance of family unity. Similarly, there are preferences in
employment visas according to one's occupation, age, skills or
183
investment. These criteria are aimed at achieving a non-racial
purpose closely related to the labor market.
181. See Regina. UKHL 55 at para 75: HCJ 7052/03. supra note 59.
182. See, e.g.. Giovanni Maria Sotgiu v. Deutsche Bundespost [1974] E.C.R. 153 at
para 11 ("The rules regarding equality of treatment . . . forbid not only overt
discrimination by reason of nationality but also all covert forms of discrimination which.
by the application of other criteria of differentiation. lead in fact to the same result."):
Regina v. Secretary of State for Employment [1997] E.C.R. at para 51 ("The existence of
statistically significant evidence is enough to establish disproportionate impact and pass
the onus to the author of the allegedly discriminatory measure."): Case of D.H. and
Others v. the Czech Republic [2007] E.C.R. at para 175. 183 ("A general policy or
measure that has disproportionately prejudicial effects on a particular group may be
considered discriminatory notwithstanding that it is not specifically aimed at that
group.").
183. See §201(b) of the INA (for preferences of family-sponsored immigrants).
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Another example is the points-based system. The system,
which Congress considered adopting in the 2007 failed
immigration reform, 1k4 has recently been adopted in Britain. The
system is an attempt to make the process of selecting immigrants
quasi-mathematical. It divides immigrants into five tiers: Tier I
focuses on highly-skilled workers; Tier II focuses on skilled
workers with a job offer; Tier III focuses on temporary lowskilled workers; Tier IV focuses on students; and Tier V focuses
on temporary workers needed to satisfy non-economic goals. 185
Each tier has different conditions and entitlements. 1K6 One's
classification is determined by the points one scores. For
instance, in order to be part of Tier I for highly-skilled workers.
the applicant must score at least ninety-five points in total. The
points are distributed based on non-racial criteria: age, previous
earnings, experience in Britain, language proficiency and funds.
This distribution has its own preferences. Take age: the system
clearly prefers young applicants. A person under twenty-eight
years of old will earn twenty points. while a person over thirty
will only earn five points. The system also prefers educated
people: an applicant will score fifty points for holding a Ph.D ..
thirty-five points for a master degree and thirty points for a
bachelor degree.
Universal criteria appear in our typology in cases two and
four: using facially-neutral criteria to achieve a racial purpose.
and using facially-neutral criteria to achieve a non-racial
purpose. One way to judge the legitimacy of universal criteria is
to implement the test of policy motivation. Take the criterion of
age. Several European states have recently fixed a minimum age
for marriage migration. In Denmark, marriage migration is only
possible if both parties are above twenty-four years of age. One
motivation for the policy can be protecting young adults from
forced and arranged marriages. The assumption is that people
below a certain age have less capacity to resist an arranged
marriage. A second motivation can be related to the immigration
scale, that is, age is just another criterion used in the general
enterprise to limit migration. In this context, states may come to

§201(d) (for preferences of employment-based immigrants).
184. See Draft Secure Borders. Economic Opportunity. and Immigration Reform
Act of 2007.
185. For details. see http://www.ukba.homeoffice.gov.uk/workingintheuk/.
186. Tiers 3 and 5. e.g., are temporary. Immigrants in these tiers cannot switch out
once they are in the UK.
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the conclusion that raising the age of marriage migration can
reduce the number of immigrants. But there might be a third
motivation. It is possible that states do not want a certain kind of
immigrants and age is just a pretext to exclude them. One could
argue that Danish citizens of Muslim origin tend to marry at a
younger age than non-Muslim Danes and, therefore, outlawing
marriage migration below twenty-four years of age may end up
excluding a high percentage of Muslim immigrants, even if non187
Muslim immigrants will also pay the price of such a policy.
Another way to judge the legitimacy of universal criteria is
to implement the test of disparate impact. This test does not
explore intent but effect. If the burden of using a specific
criterion falls on a certain racial group, then the criterion may be
regarded as illegitimate even if it is not-racially motivated. One
problem with applying this test to the context of universal
criteria is that it is hard to find criteria that have no racial
implications. Criteria such as "education" and "income" give
preferences to people from developed countries-the same with
"merits," "qualifications" and "skills." Even height and weight
are not universaL as Koreans are shorter on average than
Swedes, and Euroyeans weigh more on average than sub1
Saharan Africans. Applying a disparate impact test to the
Danish example can lead to the conclusion that age is an
illegitimate criterion as long as it leads to a racially disparate
impact. Unlike the policy motivation test, age may still be an
illegitimate criterion even if its motivation is racially-neutral.
C. POSITIVE SELECTION
A second option is positive selection. This method is
designed to identify immigrants who are most likely to
contribute to the national interests. It is premised on the same
rationale of universal selection with two differences. The first
difference is that while universal selection does not contain
racial criteria, positive selection does permit taking them into
account. Race can be one among other factors, such as skills
187. See Report by Mr. Alvaro Gil-Robles. Commissioner for Human Rights. on his
Visit to Denmark. Council of Europe 8. 22 (2004).
188. For selected data of heights and weights by countries. see the Food and
Agriculture Organization of the U.N. at http://www.fao.org/docrep/meeting/004/M2846E/
M2846E07.htm. This is not just a theoretical issue. New Zealand has banned family
migration when the foreign member fails a body mass index test. The presumption is that
overweight immigrants might become a burden on the health care services. See Aida
Edemariam. Are You too Fat to Emigrate?. THE GUARDIAN. Nov. 20.2007.
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training or work experience, to score points. Race will not be the
sole factor to determine one's eligibility for admission, but can
be one among other factors.
Positive selection appears in our typology in cases one and
three: using racial criteria to achieve a racial purpose, and using
racial criteria to achieve a non-racial purpose. The use of racial
criteria to achieve a racial purpose occurs, for instance, when an
immigrant of German ancestry gets more points in Germany,
and a Jewish immigrant gets more points in Israel, as long as the
purpose of the preferences is preserving racial hegemony (if the
preferences have a non-racial purpose, the classification falls
under case three). While race serves in these situations as a
factor giving fast-track admission to ethnic diaspora, it can also
serve as a kind of "affirmative action." The state can decide that
a specific racial group is underrepresented in its immigration
system, such as the case of African immigrants in the United
States. 189 It can further decide that being an African would give
the applicant more points. In this case, although the applicant
may not have the required level of education or wealth, she may
still be able to reach the total required points by using her
African descent.
A second difference between positive and universal
selection is that positive selection does not include criteria for
inadmissibility. In a typical points-based system, the applicant is
admissible when she earns the required points unless some
grounds for inadmissibly exist, such as health, criminal or
security-related grounds. Positive selection includes no
exclusionary criteria. Everyone is admissible-even people with
criminal record, student visa abusers, etc.-as long as the
applicant earns the total scores required. The process is flexible
and takes into account a wide range of factors. On the one hand,
the applicant can gain points for family ties with citizens, skills
and being a national of specific countries. On the other hand, the
applicant can lose points because of a criminal conviction, or
being a citizen of a less-favored country. Hence, one can lose
points for having prior convictions, but earn points because of
education, personal net worth, or a particular more-favored
country.

1R9.

See infra notes 202-205 and accompanying text.
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A similar system has recently been adopted in Britain as
190
an upgrade to the recently-launched points-based system. On
August 2009, the Home Office announced that in addition to
the points-based entry criteria, would-be citizens need to earn
points to become British citizens. The novelty of the new plan
is to extend the logic of points-based selection from
immigration policy to citizenship law. It sets up three stages
needed to become a British citizen: tem~orary residence,
91
probationary citizenship, and citizenship.
The path to
citizenship has been extended from five to ten years, yet
applicants can shorten this period by becoming active members
of political parties or trade unions, or performing sociallybeneficial volunteer work. Extra points are also granted for
working in areas in-need of immigration, such as Scotland, and
for fast integrating, e.g., by learning English. 192 The applicant,
however, can lose points for "bad behavior." Points will be
de~ucted f~r eng.aging in genera~ly-le ~ al ~ctivities . such as
1
takmg part m antt-war demonstrations, 1 - failures to mtegrate
into the British way of life, anti-social behaviors, criminal
activities or showing disregard for British values. The system is
flexible; it raises or lowers the threshold for settlement
according to Britain's changing circumstances.
D. RANDOM SELECTION

A third option is to select immigrants randomly. The United
States has had a lottery selection in place in various versions
since 1986. Each year some 55,000 persons are randomly
190. See Citizenship Points Plan Launched. BBC, Aug. 3 2009; Richard Edwards,
Immigrants Denied Citizenship for Demonstrating against British Troops, DAILY
TELEGRAPH, Aug. 3. 2009: Alistair Macdonald, U.K. to Review and Tighten
Requirements for Citizenship. WALL ST. 1.. Aug. 3. 2009: Alan Travis, New Migrants to
Britain Face ·Points Test for Citizenship.' THE GUARDIAN, Aug. 3, 2009.
191. See The Borders. Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009, available at
http://www .england-legislation.hmso.gov .uk/ acts/ acts2009/pdf/ukpga_20090011_en. pdf.
For a detailed discussion. see Analysis of the Points Based System (August
2009), available at http://www.bia.homeoffice.gov.uk/sitecontent/documents/aboutus/
workingwithus/mac/pbsanalysis-09/0809/mac-august-09?view=Binary.
The
Act
1s
expected to go into effect in 2011.
192. See Earning to Right to Stay. A New Points Test for Citizenship, Home Office: UK
Border Agency (July 2009). available at http://www.hmg.gov.uk/buildingbritainsfuture/
immigration-citizenship.aspx.
193. The ·anti-war demonstration· clause is bizarre because it reduces points for
engaging in legally-permitted activities. See Richard Ford, Anti-War Migrants Could
Damage Citizenship Hopes. THE TIMES. Aug. 4, 2009: James Slack, Immigrants Who Jeer
at British Troops in the Street to be Barred from Gaining Citizenship, DAILY MAIL. Aug.
3 2009.
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selected for permanent residence by a computer-generated
194
lottery selection. The lottery's qualifications are having a high
school diploma (or its equivalent) or having at least two years of
work experience in an occupation requiring two years of training
or experience, and having been born in a country that has a low
admission rate in the previous five years. The visas are
distributed among six regions: Africa, Asia, Europe, North
America (other than Mexico), Oceania and South America
(including Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean ). 195 The
stated objective of the lottery visas is to increase diversity. ~"
Lottery visas look neutral. Nevertheless, a closer look
reveals a fiery debate on their motivation and impact. In an
insightful article, Stephen Legomsky asserts that diversity lottery
is "merely the latest in a series of congressional attempts,
spanning more than a century, to influence the ethnic
composition of the United States immigrant stream ... [it] is new
197
in form, but not in spirit. " Critics of the lottery have two
arguments in supporting this position. To begin with, historical
evidence indicates a discriminatory purpose. The calls for the
lottery were initiated by interest groups (principally IrishAmericans) who sought to increase Irish and Western European
198
immigration. One unforeseen effect of the 1965 Immigration
Act was to shift the ethnic composition of immigrants from
Western Europe to those from Asia. Some of the architects of
the 1965 legislation expected that Western Europeans would
continue to predominate. 199 However, the number of Western
European immigrants significantly declined, while the number of
1

194. See§§ 201(e). 203(c) of the INA.
195. The visas are divided between high and low admission regions. with a higher
number of visas allocated to low-admissions regions. and no visas allocated to states
sending more than 50.000 immigrants in the previous five years. In addition. no state
receives more than seven percent of the total number of visas. Winning the lottery does
not guarantee a visa but merely establishes eligibility to receive a visa.
196. See PETER H. SCHUCK. DIVERSITY IN AMERICA: KEEPING GOVERNMENT AT A
SAFE DISTANCE 75-133 (2003).
197. See Stephen H. Legomsky. Immigration, Equality and Diversity. 31 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT"L L. 319. 321, 326 (1993).
198. See Anna 0. Law. The Diversity Visa Lottery: A Cycle of Unintended
Consequences in United States Immigration Policy. 21 J. AM. ETHNIC HIS. 3 (2002). The
original version of the diversity lottery, known as the Donnelly-Kennedy Lottery.
reserved 40 percent of the visas for Irish nationals. The INA even grants Ireland a double
status by saying that "only for purposes of administering the diversity program under this
subsection. Northern Ireland shall be treated as a separate foreign state." See §203(c)(f)
of the INA.
199. ScHeCK. supra note 196. at 87.
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Asian and Hispanic immigrants dramatically increased. The
200
lottery system was intended to correct this reality. Next, some
critics indicate that the congressional definition of a "region" has
been strategically designed to benefit European countries. They
argue that the region definitions adopted by Congress are not
geographical but cultural. By grouping "Mexico, Central
America and the Caribbean" to the South American region,
Congress has limited the access to lottery visas from this
•
2(Jl
regiOn.
Another debate surrounds the impact of lottery visas. The
2008 data show that only two percent of diversity visas were
allocated to South and Central Americans while nineteen
percent were allocated to Europeans. 202 Critics claim that this
shows a disparate impact favoring Europeans. They argue that
inasmuch as diversity is the goal justifying the lottery, the
program has failed to achieve its goal. Legomsky states that the
lottery program is "anti-diversity" because it "makes the
resulting United States population less diverse-not more
diverse- than it would otherwise be. " 203 Even lottery
proponents are critical of certain aspects of the program. Some
procedures of the lottery seem, in their view, to have a negative
impact against Africans. For example, the requirement of high
school diploma is harder to fulfill in African states, as is the
requirement to complete an application electronically, which
requires internet access and an ability to manage a computer. 204
Random immigration selection has not taken away the
controversy about racial selection. One explanation might be the
claim that one's nationality still determines one's eligibility for
participation in the lottery and one's chances of winning. What
really is random are the individual names chosen among nonrandom, or partially-random, collectives. This is why Legomsky
terms lottery visas "geographic priorities," which randomly

200. For the legislative history of the diversity lottery, see JOPPKE, supra note 5, at
74-80: SCHUCK. supra note 196. at 87-94: Jonathan H. Wardle, Note: The Strategic Use of
Mexico to Restrict South American Access to the Diversity Visa Lottery, 58 VAND. L. REV.
1963. 1974--83 (2005): Walter P. Jacob. Note: Visas: Muddled Thinking and Pork Barrel
Politics. 6 GEO. I~MIGR. L.J. 297 (1992).
201. Wardle. supra note 200. at 1987.
202. The other visas were allocated to Asian (38 percent) and African (41 percent).
See Diversity Lottery Visa 2008 Results, available at http://travel.state.gov/visa/
immigrants/types/types_l317.html.
203. Legomsky. supra note 197. at 334.
204. /d. at 1069-70.
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assign individuals but on the basis of their collective belonging.
However, in testing motivation and impact, one needs to see the
whole picture of immigrant selection. The other coin of the
negative impact of lottery visas on Hispanic immigrants is their
positive impact on African immigrants. Data show that the
lottery program provides the only viable way for Africans
seeking to immigrate to the United States who do not have preexisting family or business ties to qualify. 205 The lottery positively
affects a group that is still underrepresented in U.S. immigration
law. Hence, lottery visas may not diversify the U.S. population,
but it greatly diversifies the composition of immigrant
population to the United States. 206 The diversity lottery may have
a disparate impact against Asians and Latinos, but taken as a
whole, U.S. immigration law actually favors Asian and Latin
Americans. 207
The critique of lottery visas does not focus on the principle
of random selection but on its being badly managed. 208 What is
not clear is whether the critique is about the lottery's criteria or
purposes. The criteria used by the lottery are not really racebased: a high school diploma, two years of work experience,
209
etc. It is possible to cast doubt whether the criterion of
"region" has been strategically designed to have nationalitybased or racial impact, but this argument focuses on the
purposes and not on the criteria. It may be the case that diversity
visas were somehow racially motivated, or have racial
implication, but this is a different argument. It still allows
205.
(1994).

See Bill 0. Hing, Messages of Exclusion ro African Americans. 37 How. L.J. 237

206. /d. at 1064-(;5 ("'Overall. the diversity visa program has increased opportunities
for African immigration to the United States by 64% between FY 1994 and FY 1997."):
Andowah A. Newton, Note: Injecting Diversity into U.S. Immigration Policy: The
Diversity Visa Program and the Missing Discourse on its Impact on African Immigration
to the United States. 38 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 1049 (2005) ("'The diversity visa program
presents an opportunity to reduce some of the effects of the past exclusion of Africans
and to increase their representation in the U.S. immigrant population.").
207. /d. Diversity visas constitute only six percent of the total immigrant visas and
thus their impact on the immigration system is negligible.
208. But see SCHUCK, supra note 196, at 128 ("A visa to the United States is the
most valuable resource that mobile foreigners can ever hope to obtain ... no convincing
conception of justice demands ... that this precious asset should simply be given away at
random and without reference to any benefits for American society ... no other country
allocates its valuable visas by lottery.").
209. /d. at 127 ("'Although the system, like any complex practice. affects different
states differently. the important point is that its disparate impacts result not from
invidious discrimination but from the differential effects of the per-country ceilings. the
timing of earlier migrations. their demographic mix. and other such factors.'').

2010]

IMMIGRATION SELECTION

293

classifying the lottery system, in our typology, in cases two and
four: using facially-neutral criteria in order to achieve a racial
purpose, or a non-racial purpose.
E. RACIAL SELECTION WITH JUST COMPENSATION
A fourth option is to sustain some forms of racial selection
while compensating for the discriminatory effect. This is
intended to ensure that states do not just racially discriminate,
but do so based on just interests for which they are willing to
pay. This idea requires an in depth discussion: Who will
compensate and who will be compensated (is the compensation
between nations, or between nations and individuals?), how will
the compensation be distributed, what kind of compensation is
appropriate, what is the compensation about, and why should
states compensate for immigration decisions to begin with? We
do not deal with these issues here but rather present three
examples of this kind of reasoning from Europe, Israel and the
United States.
In recent years, some European governments have started
to pay immigrants to leave. This development started in Spain
and spread like a virus across Europe. The idea is simple: No
immigrant is forced to leave, but there is a tempting incentive for
voluntary departure. A person who chooses to leave and
promises not to come back will be paid. The sums are not
insubstantial: Sweden pays 30,000 kronor (about $4,000),
Denmark 100,000 krone (about $20,000), France almost $8,000,
and the Czech Republic just under $1,000. Spain is offering an
amount equals to six months of benefits, which is about
210
$18,500. The payment is not a compensation for inadmissibility
or denying access to citizenship, but instead represents an
indirect compensation for voluntary leaving. In some countries, a
pilot program offers immigrants additional help in returning to
their home countries, such as a payment of a few thousand
210. See And Don't Come Back. THE ECONOMIST, July 2. 2009; Foreigners to Get
100,000 Kroner Incentive to Leave Denmark. THE COPENHAGEN POST ONLINE, Nov. 9,
2009: France to Pay Immigrants to Return Home. SPIEGEL ONLINE. May 24. 2007: Henry
McDonald. Irish Gm·ernment to Pay Immigrants to Go Home. THE GUARDIAN. Nov. 15.
2009: Christian Peregin. New Incentive to Help Immigrants Return Home. TiMES OF
MALTA. Nov. 8. 2009: Joe lien Perry. The Czech Republic Pays for Immigrants to Go
Home. WALL ST. 1.. Apr. 28. 2009: Spain: Immigrants Shun Plan to Take Money. Go
Home. THE BOSTOS HERALD. Nov. 13. 2009: Spain to Pay Immigrants to Leave, THE
GUARDIAN, July 21. 2008: Tom Whitehead, Foreign Prisoners Handed £500 Cash Cards
to Go Home. THE TELEGRAPH. Dec. 22. 2009.
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dollars to set up a business. Indeed, thousands of immigrants left
Europe following a resettlement package to resettle in their
home country. 211
The European policy uses non-racial criteria to encourage
people to leave. Immigrants of all races are entitled to take the
money and go away. What is unclear is the policy purpose. There
can be many reasons for such policies; among others is the
economic downturn, but also failures of integration. It may be
cheaper to pay people to leave than to invest in their integration
or provide them with unemployment benefits. But there might
be another purpose. It is possible that some states seek by such
payments to encourage immigrants who share a specific ethnic
descent to leave. In that case, using the test of policy motivation.
the practice may be illegitimate. A similar conclusion applies if
the policy affects immigrants having certain ethnic origins.
Suppose the United States uses non-racial criteria to
achieve a non-racial purpose. The government can decide. for
example, that one possible step to reduce the number of
unauthorized immigrants is to pay them to leave. Assume that
the policy is not motivated by xenophobia, but is intended to
achieve a legitimate economic purpose. Under the test of
intentional discrimination, such policy can be legitimate. even if
it mainly impacts Mexican immigrants. One might ask: Will it be
permissible to use a racial criterion to achieve a non-racial
purpose? And what about using a non-racial criterion that
intends to achieve a racial purpose?
A version of this last idea was promoted by the Israeli rightwing former Knesset Member Michael Kleiner. Kleiner
presented a bill to "encourage people who do not identify with
Israel as a Jewish State" to leave. The bill stated that "any
resident or citizen who emigrates to an Arab country shall be
entitled to a special payment. " 212 The bill was a mix match of
racial and non-racial criteria. In principle, every Israeli citizen
could have participated in the program. However. the program
only applied to citizens who were willing to leave to an Arab
state, usually Israeli Arab citizens. Indeed, Kleiner's purpose
was to encourage Palestinian citizens, whom he saw as a threat to
Israel's right to self-determination, to leave the country. The bill
211.

See Lisa Abend, Spain Tries to Buy Out Immigrants. TiME. Oct. 20.2008.
See Chaim Gans, Nationalist Priorities and Restrictions in Immigration: The
Case of Zionist and Israel. 2 L. & ETHICS OF HCM. RTS. (2008).
212

2010]

IMMIGRATION SELECTION

295

was thus a combination of racial and non-racial criteria, designed
to achieve a racial purpose. Unlike the European practice, which
applies to aliens, Kleiner's bill sought to encourage citizens to
leave the country. 213 Eventually, the bill was labeled as racist by
the Speaker of the Knesset and has never been discussed. It
combined racial motivations with a racial purpose by using a
racial criterion. It was an illegitimate policy under the tests of
policy motivation and policy impact.
While the European and Israeli policies are a form of
compensation between nations and individuals, another option
can be having a mechanism of compensation between nations.
States might decide to limit a certain kind of immigration by
reaching a mutual agreement. For example, State X might
enhance its border enforcement in return for some economic or
other benefits from State Z. In this case, State Z provides
"subsidies' for State X's actions. These arrangements can work
on the opposite side: State Z might impose sanctions on State X
for not cooperating over border infiltration. One example may
be a recent bill promoted by Pennsylvania Senator Arlen
Specter. The bill provides that the United States would impose
sanctions on states that refuse to take back their illegal
214
immigrants.
Among the suggested sanctions is denial of
immigrant visa or denial of foreign aid. Spencer notes that some
countries refuse to take back their citizens- illegal immigrants
who are waiting for deportation. Giving some flexibility to
diplomatic considerations, he suggests punishing countries that
do not cooperate. 21 ;
This Part presents some alternative methods of selecting
immigrants. None of them is completely race-blind, though some
are less race-based. One lesson is that not every race-based
policy is racist and xenophobic, the same as not every meritsbased system is to be celebrated as racially-neutral. The picture,
as this Part presents, is much more complicated.
CONCLUSION
Some twenty-two years ago, Columbia Law Professor Louis
Henkin indicated that even one hundred years after it was
213. /d.
214. See The Accountability in Immigrant Repatriation Act of 2008. HR 5761.
215. See Eunice Moscoso. Bill Would Punish Nations that Reject Own Emigrants.
Cox NEWS. May 4. 2008.
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decided, the Chinese Exclusion Case was "still very much with
16
us. "c As long as the Chinese Exclusion Case is read to permit
racial, religious, and nationality-based classifications, Henkin's
observation is still valid today. To a surprisingly large extent, the
power of Congress to regulate immigrant selection based on
invidious distinctions continues to exist and, even more so,
continues to be legally permitted to an extent not matched in
any other avenue of American jurisprudence.
Liberal democracies will continue in the foreseeable future
to select immigrants into their societies. Borders will most
probably be left neither completely closed nor completely
open. The challenge is how to manage immigrant selection. This
Article seeks to fill the gap in a theoretical question that has farreaching practical implications.

216. See Louis Henkin, The Constitution and United States Sovereignty: A Century of
Chinese Exclusion and its Progeny. !00 HARV. L. REV. R53. 854 (19R7).

